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Abstract: Modern technology enables people to view, document, and share evi-
dence of crimes contemporaneously or soon after commission. Electronic trans-
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mission of this material—including through social media and mobile devices—
raises legal, moral, and practical questions about spectators’ responsibilities. In 
the digital age, will these actors be bystanders or upstanders? What role can and 
should the law play in shaping their behavior?  
 This Article argues that certain witnesses who are not physically present at the 
scene of a crime should be held criminally accountable for failing to report speci-
fied violent offenses of which they are aware. Focusing on rape, police brutality, 
and other misconduct, this Article demonstrates that recent technological innova-
tions create new opportunities and challenges to pursue justice and accountabil-
ity. Such culpability centers on “Bad Samaritan laws,” statutes that impose a le-
gal duty to assist others in peril through intervening directly (also known as “the 
duty to rescue”) or notifying authorities (also known as “the duty to report”). 
Many of these antiquated laws, however, arguably apply only to witnesses who 
are physically present, which limits their potential effectiveness today.  
 Not all virtual witnesses should be subject to liability. This Article introduces 
a novel typology of bystanders and upstanders in the digital age to consider cate-
gories of actors that may warrant criminal punishment. This typology draws on 
an original case study of the first known sexual crime livestreamed in the United 
States by a third party, which more than 700 people viewed. Harnessing insights 
from that case study and other episodes, this Article recommends that legislators 
should modernize, refine, proliferate, and publicize Bad Samaritan laws, and that 
law enforcement should enforce these statutes or leverage them to obtain witness 
testimony. To that end, this Article proposes a model duty-to-report statute that 
applies to virtual presence and includes reasoned exemptions for noncompliance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern technology enables a potentially massive, distributed audience to 
view, document, and share evidence of crimes—including rape, police brutali-
ty, murder, terrorism, and genocide—contemporaneously or shortly after 
commission. Electronic transmission and receipt of this material through, for 
example, social media and mobile devices, raises legal, moral, and practical 
questions about spectators’ responsibilities. In “the digital age,”1 what role can 
and should the law play in prodding would-be “bystanders”2 to act instead as 
“upstanders”3? 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Digital Age, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
digital-age [https://perma.cc/SBQ7-WKMM] (“[T]he present time, in which many things are done by 
computer and large amounts of information are available because of computer technology.”). 
 2 Bystander, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/25640?redirected
From=bystander#eid [https://perma.cc/8PCT-TCDX] (“One who is standing by; one who is present 
without taking part in what is going on; a passive spectator.”). 
 3 Upstander, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/220189?rskey=
Os8ejT&result=1#eid [https://perma.cc/SV4C-Z5C7] (“A person who speaks or acts in support of a 
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Extant legal scholarship favoring bystander liability does not adequately 
address the digital context.4 This literature either argues that only in-person 
witnesses to particular crimes (such as rape5) should be required to notify po-
lice, does not sufficiently analyze nuances between or among online and of-
fline bystanders,6 or considers only cyberbullying7 or tort law.8 In addition, 
although several academics have analyzed liability for online “platforms”9 
(which is typically shielded by Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act of 199610), there is a dearth of scholarship about culpability for their by-
                                                                                                                           
cause, esp. one who intervenes on behalf of a person being attacked or bullied.”). For the history of 
this term, see Zachary D. Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders 
amid Sexual Crimes, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1327 n. 42 (2019). 
 4 See infra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 5 Kimberley K. Allen, Note, Guilt by (More Than) Association: The Case for Spectator Liability 
in Gang Rapes, 99 GEO. L.J. 837, 839 (2011) (advocating for statutes to require witnesses to report 
rape). 
 6 Patricia Grande Montana, Watch or Report? Livestream or Help? Good Samaritan Laws Revis-
ited: The Need to Create a Duty to Report, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 533, 551–58 (2018) (arguing for 
duty to aid statutes rooted in historical precedent); Sharon Yamen et al., Am I My Brother’s Keeper? 
How Technology Necessitates Reform of the Lack of Duty to Rescue or Duty to Report Laws in the 
United States, 28 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 117–18 (2019) (examining Bad Samaritan laws and propos-
ing a new statutory regime to address shortfalls). 
 7 See Heather Benzmiller, Note, The Cyber-Samaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the 
“Innocent” Bystanders of Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 927, 927 (2013) (proposing that wit-
nesses of cyberbullying be held liable under Bad Samaritan laws). 
 8 See Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 
68, 68, 81–82, 110 (2017) (proposing a new tort for “mocking and maligning” someone in distress 
through filming or photographing them called “exploitative objectification of a person in need of 
emergency assistance”). Professor Amelia Uelmen’s proposed tort is limited to physical presence. Id. 
at 118–19. In comparison, this Article proposes criminal liability for witnesses who are both physical-
ly and virtually present. 
 9 Platform, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/145374?rskey=7sr36r
&result=1#eid [https://perma.cc/2A7U-LGQN] (“A standard system architecture; a (type of) machine 
and/or operating system, regarded as the base on which software applications are run.”). For discus-
sion of the legal issues surrounding platforms, see generally Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in 
Moderation, 53 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 41 (2020) (discussing automated online content monitoring); 
Rebecca J. Hamilton, Governing the Global Public Square, 62 HARV. INT’L L.J. 117 (2021) (explor-
ing the global public square and its implications); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, 
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1635–48 (2018) (analyzing 
rules for and methods of reactive online content moderation); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online 
Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1355–56, 1361–62 (2018) (criticizing current content mod-
eration regimes of social media companies). 
 10 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”); id. 
§ 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section.”). For discussion of 47 U.S.C. § 230, see, for example, 
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 170–77 (2014) (reviewing the history of 
§ 230); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 519 n.490 (2002) (stating 
that § 230 “immunizes [internet services providers] not only from defamation liabilities, but also from 
tort actions arising from obscenity”); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Re-
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stander users.11 This Article thus argues more comprehensively that certain 
witnesses who are not physically present at the scene of the crime should be 
held criminally accountable for failing to report specified violent offenses of 
which they are aware: murder, kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravated assault, 
and felonious assault.12 
                                                                                                                           
venge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 359 (2014) (stating that “[c]ourts have interpreted § 230 
to largely immunize from liability website owners and operators for tortious material submitted by 
third-party users”); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 (2009) (argu-
ing that “some courts read § 230 to grant sweeping immunity far beyond what its words and context 
supported”); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1931 (2019) (arguing that, 
because of § 230, “the parties in the best position to minimize potential harm—content platforms—
have no legal incentive to intervene, and plaintiffs cannot sue these giant corporations to provide them 
with a legal reason to bother”); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech 
Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 46, https://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1662&context=uclf [https://perma.cc/8E5J-
U9MC] (stating that legislators’ intent in enacting § 230 “was to incentivize, rather than penalize, 
private efforts to filter, block, or otherwise address noxious activity”); Danielle Keats Citron & Ben-
jamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 401, 403 (2017) (arguing that “§ 230 immunity is too sweeping”); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas 
H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social 
Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 103 (2002) (arguing that “[t]orts in cyberspace are already being sty-
mied by state tort retractions and federal piecemeal reforms like section 230”); Olivier Sylvain, Re-
covering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 252, 253 (2019), https://columbialawreview.
org/content/recovering-techs-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/B6RT-BATN] (arguing that, under the pre-
vailing § 230 doctrine, “powerful companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon do not have any 
legal obligation to block or remove user-generated content that they have no hand in ‘creat[ing]’ or 
‘develop[ing]’” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)); Laura Cannon, Comment, Indecent Communications: 
Revenge Porn and Congressional Intent of § 230(C), 90 TUL. L. REV. 471, 473 (2015) (arguing that 
§ 230 “does not provide immunity for websites that encourage and aid in the development of involun-
tary porn by providing a platform dedicated to its promotion and dissemination”); Alexandra Lotty, 
Note, Apps Too: Modifying Interactive Computer Service Provider Immunity Under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act in the Wake of “Me Too,” 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 887 (2020) (arguing 
that “current interpretations of the scope of section 230 immunity wrongfully deny individuals who 
have been sexually harassed or assaulted an opportunity to hold online services accountable for caus-
ing or exacerbating their harms”). 
 11 In an article published as this one was in the final editing stages, Professor Eldar Haber builds 
on previous scholarship by me and others, including attorneys Heather Benzmiller and Natalie Perrin-
Smith Vance, to consider the culpability of online bystander users for violating Bad Samaritan laws. 
See Eldar Haber, The Digital Samaritans, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1559 (2020). In contrast to Ha-
ber’s contribution, which expresses opposition to applying existing Bad Samaritan laws in the digital 
context, id. at 1596, 1623, this Article finds the expansion of these statutes to be desirable in certain 
contexts and proposes ways to improve their application, see infra Part IV. Moreover, this Article 
provides more nuanced treatment of subcategories of online bystanders, upstanders, and enablers, in 
part because it considers both livestreams and recordings, whereas Haber’s interest is primarily in 
livestreams. Haber’s article offers helpful insights in its discussion of the potential liability of non-
human bystanders (e.g., artificial intelligence) and related concerns about platform governance, topics 
this Article does not address. See generally Haber, supra. 
 12 Some states, such as Ohio, distinguish between felonious and aggravated assault. Compare 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (West 2020) (criminalizing felonious assault as a first- or second-
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This Article is the second in a series of articles that I am writing about 
“Bad Samaritan laws”—statutes that “impose a legal duty to assist others in 
peril through intervening directly (also known as ‘the duty to rescue’) or noti-
fying authorities (also known as ‘the duty to report’).”13 The first Article, Pro-
tectors of Predators or Prey, was inspired by the #MeToo movement and fo-
cused on witnesses to sexual crimes in the United States, whether or not ob-
servers used modern technology.14 In that Article, I raised issues and questions 
regarding online bystanders (which I termed “fourth parties”), arguing that the 
advent of mobile devices and social media has complicated dynamics of ad-
dressing crime spectators.15 Since then, people’s increasingly online lives have 
made these complexities all the more pressing.16 
                                                                                                                           
degree felony), with id. § 2903.12 (criminalizing aggravated assault as a third- or fourth-degree felo-
ny). 
 13 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1325 (defining “Bad Samaritan laws). I am also writing a series of 
related essays and opinion pieces about bystanders, upstanders, enablers, and Bad Samaritan laws. See 
Zachary D. Kaufman, Lessons from Rwanda: Post-Genocide Law and Policy, 31 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. ONLINE 1, 20–21 (2019), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2019.
08.02-Lessons-from-Rwanda-Zachary-D.-Kaufman-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VQV-JUWP] (arguing 
that one of ten lessons from the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda is that “upstanderism is 
imperative”); Zachary D. Kaufman, Give the Nobel Peace Prize Posthumously, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 
5, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/give-the-nobel-peace-prize-posthumously/ [https://
perma.cc/H5P9-VDZS] (arguing that Aung San Suu Kyi’s Nobel Peace Prize should be revoked and 
that such prizes should only be awarded posthumously); Zachary D. Kaufman, Islam Is (Also) a Reli-
gion of Peace, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 4, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/04/islam-is-also-
religion-of-peace-humayun-khizr-khan-trump/ [https://perma.cc/LG9M-Z76P] (discussing Muslim 
upstanders amid conflict, including genocide); Zachary D. Kaufman, Opinion, No Cover for Abusers; 
California Must Close Gap in Its Duty-to-Report Law, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2019, at A15 [hereinaf-
ter Kaufman, No Cover for Abusers] (arguing that the California legislature should reform the state’s 
duty-to-report law); Zachary D. Kaufman, Opinion, What Makes People Save Lives? Learning from 
Upstanders and Bystanders, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/ny-oped-what-makes-people-save-lives-20201027-7h3fdrnbfvey5oeqmjoclh6cyq-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/NM49-4KD8] [hereinafter Kaufman, What Makes People Save Lives?] (analyzing 
positive and negative implications of celebrating purported upstanders); Zachary D. Kaufman, Opin-
ion, When Speaking Up Is a Civic Duty, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2018, at K6 [hereinafter Kaufman, 
Speaking Up] (proposing state and federal duty-to-report laws for sexual crimes). 
 For other recent discussion of Bad Samaritan laws and Good and Bad Samaritanism, see, for 
example, Travis Coon, Hike at Your Own Risk: In Support of No-Rescue Wilderness Designations, 
124 PENN ST. L. REV. 529, 532–43 (2020) (addressing the context of Americans venturing into remote 
and wild areas); Itamar Mann, The Right to Perform Rescue at Sea: Jurisprudence and Drowning, 21 
GERMAN L.J. 598, 599–600 (2020) (addressing the context of migration); Shalini Bhargava Ray, The 
Law of Rescue, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 619, 652–59 (2020) (same); Sarah L. Swan, Bystander Interven-
tions, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1028–35 (discussing bystander intervention initiatives). For a list of 
additional scholarship on Bad Samaritan laws and Good and Bad Samaritanism, see Kaufman, supra 
note 3, at 1328 n.43. 
 14 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1330–35. 
 15 Specifically, that Article argued that technological advances of the digital age have increased 
awareness of emergencies, decreased justifications for not reporting them, and strengthened evidence 
of witnesses and their conduct. Id. at 1342. It further argued that fourth parties could become aware of 
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My research for this series of articles included compiling the most com-
prehensive global database of Bad Samaritan laws, encompassing U.S., for-
eign, and international statutes.17 These laws—which vary by subject matter, 
victims to whom they apply, and individuals who must comply—are contro-
versial. Protectors of Predators or Prey addressed debates about the laws’ ori-
gins, operations, outcomes, and objections (constitutional and otherwise)18 and 
established that the statutes are far more prevalent and longstanding in the 
United States than scholars had previously recognized.19 Bad Samaritan laws 
in the United States date back to the eighteenth century.20 Many were prompt-
ed by cases of bystanderism that shocked the public consciousness, particularly 
                                                                                                                           
emergencies contemporaneously or near-contemporaneously and that some of these individuals should 
shoulder a duty to report. Id. at 1372–73. Additionally, it contended that existing Bad Samaritan laws 
vary on whether the law’s subjects must be physically near the crime, that physical presence should 
not be an element of the crime of failing to report, and that such amended or reinterpreted statutes 
would introduce numerical and jurisdictional complications. Id. at 1390–91. 
 16 Ella Koeze & Nathaniel Popper, The Virus Changed the Way We Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html 
[https://perma.cc/JGD3-MYPR] (observing that “during the coronavirus pandemic . . . Americans 
have been spending more of their lives online”). 
 17 Bad Samaritan Laws, ZACHARY D. KAUFMAN, http://www.zacharykaufman.com/bad-
samaritan-laws [https://perma.cc/K5A5-TKZE] [hereinafter Appendix]. 
 18 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1335–42 (analyzing critiques of Bad Samaritan laws’ impetus, 
nature, consequences, and effectiveness). 
 19 Id. at 1326, 1345–46 (arguing that scholars undercount or mischaracterize Bad Samaritan laws 
in the United States). 
 20 A federal statutory crime of misprision of felony was first enacted in 1790 and is currently 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4. Gabriel D.M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 697, 721 (2003). This crime has been interpreted to require proactive concealment rather than 
mere failure to report or otherwise intervene. See 18 U.S.C. § 4; United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 
1225, 1227 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The mere failure to report a felony is not sufficient to constitute a viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4.”). For discussion of this statute, see Ciociola, supra, at 721–23 (stating that 
the statute requires a “positive act of concealment”); Alison M. Arcuri, Comment, Sherrice Iverson 
Act: Duty to Report Child Abuse and Neglect, 20 PACE L. REV. 471, 474–76 (2000) (providing an 
overview, including the elements, of misprision of felony). See generally Royal G. Shannonhouse, III, 
Misprision of a Federal Felony: Dangerous Relic or Scourge of Malfeasance?, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 59 
(1974). 
 In 1870, Louisiana became one of the first three states to enact a misprision statute resembling 
the federal one, Act 120, Section 57, 1855 La. Acts 139, but this law was repealed in 1942. Ciociola, 
supra, at 723–24. Vermont later became the first state, in 1967, Act 309, Section 2, 1967 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 273, to enact a genuine Bad Samaritan law—criminalizing only omissions—that remains in 
force. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (West 2021) (“A person who knows that another is exposed to 
grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to him-
self or herself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance 
to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.”); Marc A. Franklin, 
Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 55 (1972) (stating, at the time, that “the 
Vermont statute is unique in American law”). 
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involving sexual crimes.21 Today, twenty-nine states and Puerto Rico feature 
Bad Samaritan laws applying to most or all physically-present witnesses,22 and 
Congress enacted a narrow federal Bad Samaritan law in 2018.23 Such statutes 
also exist in dozens of foreign countries and multiple subfields of international 
law.24 
Because enactment of most Bad Samaritan laws in the United States pre-
ceded the digital age,25 legislators did not anticipate how evidence of crimes 
could be widely and rapidly shared electronically. Thus, the statutes’ applica-
bility to distant bystanders is ambiguous. For example, laws in Hawaii,26 Mas-
sachusetts,27 and Washington28 apply only to individuals at the scene of the 
crime (which, if limited to physical presence at the scene, would exclude re-
mote observers). Alternatively, California,29 Florida,30 and Texas31 laws apply 
to individuals who observe the crime (which, if such observation includes vir-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1337 (noting that reforms have “occasionally occurred after notori-
ous, egregious cases of sexual misconduct”); Swan, supra note 13, at 1000 (citing the fatal sexual 
assault of Sherrice Iverson as an example). 
 22 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1345–47 nn.150–52. The twenty-nine states are: Alaska, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minneso-
ta, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Id.; Appendix, supra note 17 (listing all Bad Samaritan laws in the United States, including Puerto 
Rico). 
 23 Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 115-126, 132 Stat. 318 (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 220542). The statute provides in part that “all 
adults authorized by such members [of a national governing body] to interact with an amateur athlete 
[shall] report immediately any allegation of child abuse of an amateur athlete who is a minor to . . . 
law enforcement.” 36 U.S.C. § 220542(a)(2)(A).  
 24 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1326, 1342–43; Appendix, supra note 17. Among other foreign 
countries, this database includes Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, Comoros, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Honduras, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Appendix, supra note 17. 
 25 See Appendix, supra note 17 (listing Bad Samaritan laws’ years of enactment). 
 26 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6(a) (2021) (imposing a duty to assist only upon persons “at the 
scene of a crime”). 
 27 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2021) (imposing a duty to report to law enforcement officials 
only upon persons who are “at the scene of said crime”). 
 28 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1)(a)–(c) (2021) (imposing duty to notify public officials only 
upon persons “who witness[] the actual commission of” violent offenses or sexual offenses against 
children). 
 29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(a) (West 2021) (imposing a duty to notify peace officers only upon 
people “who reasonably believe[] that [they] ha[ve] observed the commission” of the crime). 
 30 FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (2020) (imposing a duty to report to law enforcement officers only upon 
a person “who observes the commission of the crime”). 
 31 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17(a)(1) (West 2019) (imposing a duty to stop or to report to 
peace officers or law enforcement agencies only upon a person who “observes the commission or 
attempted commission of [a specified] offense”). 
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tual observation, could include off-site witnesses). Still other laws, such as in 
Ohio,32 Vermont,33 and Wisconsin,34 apply to individuals who know of the 
crime (which could also include ex-situ spectators). Therefore, under existing 
statutes, physically present witnesses could be punished, even though their cost 
of action is high (because they are more likely to experience peril personally if 
they intervene).35 Meanwhile, virtually present spectators may not be pun-
ished, even though their cost of intervention is low (because they are better 
able to alert authorities without criminals knowing).36 To ensure that prosecu-
tors could reach individuals who view crimes electronically, legislators should 
introduce or amend Bad Samaritan laws. 
As considerations involving criminal duty-to-report statutes are so vast, 
other potentially relevant laws and policies are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For example, in some scenarios, witnesses could be charged with crimes 
other than violating a Bad Samaritan law, such as child pornography37 and ac-
complice liability.38 Bystanders could potentially be held civilly liable, a topic 
tort scholars have addressed.39 Community programs that promote up-
standerism, particularly in high-risk settings (such as college campuses), could 
                                                                                                                           
 32 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2020) (imposing a duty to report to law en-
forcement authorities upon people “knowing that a felony has been or is being committed”). 
 33 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (West 2021) (imposing a duty to assist upon a person “who 
knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm”). 
 34 WIS. STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2020) (imposing a duty to aid or to report to law enforcement offic-
ers upon a person “who knows that a crime is being committed”). 
 35 See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
 36 See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
 37 MacKenzie Smith, Note, You Can Touch, but You Can’t Look: Examining the Inconsistencies 
in Our Age of Consent and Child Pornography Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 859, 864 (2014) (stating that 
“all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have laws prohibiting child 
pornography,” defined as visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor). Federal 
laws on sexual exploitation and other abuse of children are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260A. 
One section criminalizes mere receipt of such material. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (applying to “[a]ny 
person who . . . knowingly receives . . . any child pornography”). The U.S. Supreme Court has unani-
mously held that child pornography is not protected under the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 765–66 (1982) (holding that “the State is not barred by the First Amendment from pro-
hibiting the distribution of unprotected materials produced outside the State”). 
 38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, 
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”); Lind-
sey Linder & Justin Martinez, No Path to Redemption: Evaluating Texas’s Practice of Sentencing 
Kids to De Facto Life Without Parole in Adult Prison, 22 SCHOLAR 307, 336 (2020) (“Nearly every 
state has an accomplice liability law that ensures culpable individuals are not absolved of crimes they 
helped commit even if they were not the primary perpetrators.”). 
 39 Kenneth S. Abraham & Leslie Kendrick, There’s No Such Thing as Affirmative Duty, 104 IO-
WA L. REV. 1649, 1654 (2019) (clarifying that there is no general duty to rescue, absent some “affirm-
ative dut[y]” exception to the general rule). Additionally, Professor Martha Chamallas considered 
whether the #MeToo movement “has the potential to accelerate and intensify the trend to hold third 
parties responsible in tort.” Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #MeToo Moment?, 11 J. TORT 
L. 39, 45 (2018). 
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be strengthened and spread.40 Finally, carrots, as well as sticks (the Bad Samar-
itan laws), could be used to incentivize upstanderism, a subject I have analyzed 
elsewhere.41 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview and ex-
amples of bystanderism and upstanderism in the digital age, including amid 
rape and police brutality.42 As this Part demonstrates, recent technology creates 
new opportunities and challenges to pursue justice and accountability. 
As an illuminating (albeit harrowing) case study, Part II presents the first 
known instance of a sexual crime “livestreamed”43 in the United States by a 
third party (the “Gates-Lonina case”).44 In 2016 in Columbus, Ohio, a woman 
(Marina Lonina) broadcast in real time the rape (perpetrated by Robert Gates) 
of her supposed best friend.45 Of the more than 700 viewers,46 only one alerted 
the police.47 To research this case, which involved a variety of bystanders and 
upstanders, I examined and generated numerous primary sources. By submit-
ting a public records request to the Columbus Police Department (“CPD”), I 
obtained audio and video recordings of investigators’ interviews with Gates 
and Lonina, images of the crime scene, and the 150-page police file.48 I also 
conducted the first comprehensive interviews with five key figures in the case: 
the lead prosecutor (Ron O’Brien), the assistant prosecutor (Jennifer Rausch), 
the lead detective (Brent Close), Lonina’s defense counsel (Samuel Sham-
ansky), and the only upstander who alerted law enforcement (“the Reporter,” 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Swan, supra note 13, at 977–78 (noting that “schools, college campuses, military bases, work-
places, and other institutions have already implemented bystander intervention training programs”). 
 41 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1396–1403 (advocating for identifying and incentivizing upstanders).  
 42 See infra notes 60–123 and accompanying text. 
 43 Live Stream, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/live_stream [https://perma.cc/
6AV6-NJSN] (“A live transmission of an event over the internet.”); see also Grace Studer, Note, Live 
Streaming Violence Over Social Media: An Ethical Dilemma, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 621, 625 
(2017) (describing “live streaming” as videos “uploaded to the Internet and disseminated instantane-
ously”). 
 44 See infra notes 124–170 and accompanying text. 
 45 Mike McPhate, Teenager Is Accused of Live-Streaming a Friend’s Rape on Periscope, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/us/periscope-rape-case-columbus-ohio-
video-livestreaming.html [https://perma.cc/QWQ4-R2XD] (describing the charges against Marina 
Lonina, who witnessed and streamed another man, Raymond Gates, raping Lonina’s friend). 
 46 Skype Interview with the Anonymous Reporter in the Gates-Lonina case (June 5, 2020) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Author-Reporter Interview 2] (noting that there were “706 or 707” people 
who viewed the rape video in real time). 
 47 See infra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. 
 48 I submitted the public records request to the Columbus Police Department (CPD) in February 
2020. The following month the CPD mailed me three CDs, which contained: (1) an audio recording of 
Close’s attempted interview of Lonina on March 2, 2016; (2) a video recording of Close’s interroga-
tion of Lonina the following day; (3) a video recording of Close’s interrogation of Gates on April 3, 
2016; (4) twenty-five crime scene photos; and (5) the partially redacted 150-page police file. 
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who requested anonymity).49 Through this extensive research, I uncovered in-
formation that incriminates more people involved in the Gates-Lonina case 
than were investigated, let alone charged, and that led me to two major conclu-
sions. First, it may have been possible yet unnecessary and undesirable to 
charge Lonina herself with violating a Bad Samaritan law (because she was 
already charged with several other, more serious offenses).50 Second, other 
people could have been so charged.51 
Analyzing the Gates-Lonina case in legal scholarship is as unprecedented 
as the case itself. Most analysis of bystander liability relies on the same three 
case studies: the rape and murder of twenty-eight-year-old Catherine “Kitty” 
Genovese in Queens, New York, on March 13, 1964 (the “Genovese case”);52 
the gang rape of twenty-one-year-old Cheryl Araujo in New Bedford, Massa-
chusetts, on March 6, 1983 (the “Araujo case”);53 and the rape and murder of 
seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson in Primm, Nevada, on May 25, 1997 (the 
“Iverson case”)54.55 The more recent, technologically infused Gates-Lonina 
case is emblematic of contemporary opportunities and challenges for respond-
ing to crimes. 
Building on the Gates-Lonina case study, Part III analyzes roles and re-
sponsibilities of third parties to crimes in the digital age.56 This Part presents 
an original typology, which is designed to maximize generalizability to other 
crimes. This Part considers whether certain categories of actors (“Transmit-
                                                                                                                           
 49 I received Institutional Review Board (IRB) permission to conduct these interviews. The IRB 
ID is: STUDY00002199. All interviews were conducted and recorded via video conference (through 
Zoom and Skype) and then transcribed. 
 50 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 292–296 and accompanying text. 
 52 David W. Dunlap, 1964 | How Many Witnessed the Murder of Kitty Genovese?, N.Y TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/insider/1964-how-many-witnessed-the-murder-
of-kitty-genovese.html [https://perma.cc/WTN7-6JTD] (describing the 1964 murder of Kitty Geno-
vese and related news reporting). Specifically, the victim was attacked three times in thirty-five 
minutes and was killed, during which more than thirty of her neighbors did not intervene. John M. 
Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of 
Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 926. 
 53 Renu Mandhane, Duty to Rescue Through the Lens of Multiple-Party Sexual Assault, 9 DAL-
HOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2000) (describing the rape, during which “[m]any people simply 
watched as [the victim] was degraded while others yelled encouragement to the people assaulting 
her”). 
 54 Andrew D. Kaplan, “Cash-ing Out”: Regulating Omissions, Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson 
Act, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67, 67 (2000) (reviewing the facts of the Iver-
son case and the subsequent legislative response). 
 55 For additional sources on the Genovese, Araujo, and Iverson cases, see Kaufman, supra note 3, 
at 1328 n.43; Kaufman, What Makes People Save Lives?, supra note 13. 
 56 See infra notes 171–398 and accompanying text. 
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ters”57 and “Receivers”) should shoulder any legal duties. Transmitters are 
physically present at the scene and share evidence of a crime electronically, 
such as through email, social media, mobile devices, or landline phones. Re-
ceivers are virtually present at the scene as remote witnesses who see, hear, or 
otherwise observe live or recorded material from Transmitters and may further 
broadcast that evidence. Each category is broken down into smaller groupings. 
Specifically, I divide Transmitters across two dimensions (conduct and timing), 
each of which has multiple subtypes, and Receivers across four dimensions 
(conduct, interaction with Transmitters, timing, and contextual knowledge), 
each of which also has multiple subtypes. Generally speaking, subtypes within 
dimensions are mutually exclusive while subtypes across dimensions are not.58 
Harnessing insights from the Gates-Lonina case and other episodes, Part 
IV offers prescriptions for improving justice and accountability in the digital 
age.59 This Part recommends that legislators modernize, refine, proliferate, and 
publicize Bad Samaritan laws and that law enforcement apply these statutes or 
leverage them to obtain witness testimony. To ensure that enforcement is rea-
sonable and manageable, this Part suggests a hierarchy of liability within the 
typology. Recognizing that existing Bad Samaritan laws are ambiguous, ane-
mic, or antiquated, this Part also proposes a model duty-to-report statute for 
the digital age that explicitly applies to virtual presence and includes reasoned 
exemptions for noncompliance. 
The Article concludes by reflecting on lessons that modern instances of 
bystanderism and upstanderism teach. Where Bad Samaritan laws exist, legis-
lators should ensure that they are effective, in part through implementing this 
Article’s model statute. Police and prosecutors should use this Article’s typolo-
gy to distinguish and prioritize liability for violating such statutes. Encourag-
ingly, even lone upstanders can make a significant difference—underscoring 
why the law should prod witnesses (whether physically or virtually present) to 
certain violent crimes to help. 
                                                                                                                           
 57 What Professor Uelmen calls “engaged spectators” are essentially what this Article calls 
“Transmitters,” including “Bystander Transmitters.” Uelmen, supra note 8, at 92 (describing “en-
gaged spectators” as bystanders “who choose to lock their attention on the scene”). She argues that 
such individuals’ recording “directly engag[es] not only the scene of an accident or an assault, but also 
in some way the vulnerable person.” Id. at 104, 108. Uelmen’s analysis, however, does not sufficient-
ly address nuances among engaged spectators, whether Transmitters or Receivers. See id. 
 58 For further discussion of mutual inclusivity and exclusivity among bystanders and upstanders, 
see Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1372. 
 59 See infra notes 399–479 and accompanying text. 
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I. OBSERVATION OF CRIME IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
In-person witnesses to crime are likely as old as crime itself.60 Today, so-
cial media and mobile devices enable people to view, document, and share evi-
dence in real time or soon thereafter. Indeed, an “[i]nternet subculture”61 has 
grown around these spectacles,62 which have occurred more frequently over 
time.63 This Part uses examples of bystanderism and upstanderism in the digi-
tal age to illustrate the opportunities and challenges that these situations can 
pose, demonstrating that the Gates-Lonina case is representative of a recurring 
phenomenon.64 
A. Opportunities 
Social media and mobile devices enable users to observe crimes, preserve 
evidence for potential investigations and prosecutions,65 raise the public’s 
awareness of misconduct, and assist victims or police after or even during the 
commission of offenses. Prosecutors can benefit from these opportunities to 
obtain convictions in situations that would have been more difficult in the past. 
This Section illustrates these possibilities by drawing on examples domestical-
ly and abroad.66 
Some of the most notorious cases involving electronic transmission and 
receipt of evidence have involved sexual abuse. Four years before and in the 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Larry O. Natt Gantt, II et al., Professional Responsibility and the Christian Attorney: Compar-
ing the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Biblical Virtues, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 58–
59 (2006) (discussing biblical notions of criminal witnesses). 
 61 See John Herrman, In the Land of Internet Subcultures, Try Not to Look Like a Tourist, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/insider/youtube-right-internet-subculture.
html [https://perma.cc/MSS6-MB8T] (describing areas online where “devoted audiences” meet, in 
which these “audiences get to know their hosts, and each other, developing those who form into fan-
doms while simultaneously experiencing ideological formation”). 
 62 Uelmen, supra note 8, at 77–78 (“The daily papers carry frequent accounts of bystanders gath-
ering to snap cell phone pictures of assaults, rapes, and even murders, as well as more run-of-the-mill 
accidents. Recently, an Internet subculture has also developed in which those who witness violent 
assaults stand by to record the incidents without intervening, and then they post the videos on social 
media.”). 
 63 Montana, supra note 6, at 535 (noting “an increase in both the livestreaming of crimes and the 
filming of accidents or disastrous events for posting online to boost traffic to personal social media 
sites”). 
 64 See infra notes 124–170 and accompanying text. People who view crime via the news are not 
among the witnesses this Article considers. These onlookers, who could reasonably assume that au-
thorities are aware, would—or at least should—be alleviated of any legal responsibility to intervene. 
 65 Professor Rebecca Hamilton calls such evidence “user-generated evidence.” Rebecca J. Hamil-
ton, User-Generated Evidence, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3 (2018) (defining “user-generated 
evidence” as that which is “recorded on a device . . . by an ordinary citizen . . . to help achieve legal 
accountability for wrongdoing”). 
 66 See infra notes 67–90 and accompanying text. 
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same state as the Gates-Lonina case, two sixteen-year-old boys raped a girl of 
the same age while the culprits and others discussed the assault, shared photos 
and videos of it, and ridiculed the girl over text messages, YouTube, Twitter, 
and Instagram (“the Steubenville case”).67 Nobody who was physically or vir-
tually present called the police.68 Alexandria Goddard, a former resident of the 
town where the crime was perpetrated and who, at the time, was in another 
state, did, however, intervene. She took screenshots of messages, photographs, 
and videos on social media to maintain them on her personal website.69 God-
dard then sent the evidence to a local police officer before it could be erased.70 
Indeed, the perpetrators and their friends had deleted many of the online posts 
about the crime before the victim’s parents reported the offense.71 
More recently, in March 2020 in Providence, Rhode Island, a mother 
found a video on Facebook of multiple men sexually assaulting her uncon-
scious sixteen-year-old daughter (“the Providence case”).72 The mother rec-
orded the video and sent it to police.73 But for Goddard’s74 and the mother’s75 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1361–71 (reviewing the facts, news reporting, investigation and 
subsequent prosecution of the Steubenville case); Alexander Abad-Santos, Everything You Need to 
Know About Steubenville High’s Football “Rape Crew,” THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/steubenville-high-football-rape-crew/317300/ [https://perma.
cc/T4N4-P42S] (specifying that the victim did not even know of the attack until seeing details of it 
online because she was intoxicated at the time of the incident). 
 68 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1366 (“According to the Cleveland Plain Dealer, ‘[Police Chief 
William] McCafferty said what bothers him most about the case is the silence—both on the night of 
the incident and now.’” (quoting Rachel Dissell, Rape Charges Against High School Players Divide 
Football Town of Steubenville, Ohio, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/
metro/index.ssf/2012/09/rape_charges_divide_football_t.html [https://perma.cc/MU7S-Q44D])). 
 69 Kaelyn Forde, How One Crime Blogger Helped Expose the Steubenville High School Rape, 
INSIDE EDITION (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.insideedition.com/how-one-crime-blogger-helped-expose-
steubenville-high-school-rape-51553 [https://perma.cc/9BP4-CK33]; Alexandria Goddard, Meet the 
Blogger Who Allegedly Complicated the Steubenville Gang Rape Case, GOOD MEN PROJECT (Mar. 20, 
2013), https://goodmenproject.com/ethics-values/meet-the-blogger-who-allegedly-complicated-the-
steubenville-gang-rape-case [https://perma.cc/A4GM-NYZ6]; Jennifer Preston, How Blogger Helped 
the Steubenville Rape Case Unfold Online, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE (Mar. 18, 2013), https://thelede.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/how-blogger-helped-steubenville-rape-case-unfold-online/ [https://
perma.cc/8CJ9-4VYX]. 
70 Forde, supra note 69. 
71 Dissell, supra note 68. 
 72 Michael Levenson, Facebook Video of Assault, Found by Victim’s Mother, Breaks Open Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/us/Providence-sexual-assault-charges.
html [https://perma.cc/49G3-JJVU]. All eight men present at the crime were charged with failing to 
report the assault and some were also charged with sexual assault. Amanda Milkovits, R.I. Grand Jury 
Indicts Eight Men in Gang Rape in Providence, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.boston
globe.com/2020/11/10/metro/ri-grand-jury-indicts-eight-men-gang-rape-providence [https://perma.cc/
KHY2-T3DT]. 
 73 Levenson, supra note 72. 
 74 Steve Almasy, Two Teens Found Guilty in Steubenville Rape Case, CNN (Mar. 17, 2013), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/17/justice/ohio-steubenville-case/index.html [https://perma.cc/8YFL-
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quick interventions to record and report in the Steubenville and Providence 
cases, respectively, investigators and prosecutors may not have obtained suffi-
cient evidence for the eventual rape convictions. 
Although Goddard’s and the mother’s conduct aided investigations after 
the sexual assaults had already been completed, upstanders can make a differ-
ence even while a crime is in progress. Coincidentally, another crime was 
broadcast from the same location (Columbus, Ohio) and via the same platform 
(Periscope) just days before Lonina’s livestreams.76 On February 16, 2016, two 
men livestreamed themselves pledging to shoot up their neighborhood with an 
AR-15 if their broadcast attracted 100 views, then handing the loaded gun to a 
toddler.77 As with the Gates-Lonina and Steubenville cases, a Receiver in a 
different state contacted police, who then arrested the perpetrators.78 
Opportunities for upstanderism in the digital age are not unique to the 
United States. In 2017, a man in Sweden livestreamed via Facebook two other 
men gang raping a woman for three hours.79 Several of the roughly sixty to 
                                                                                                                           
GW3M] (describing the legal findings against the participants in the Steubenville case); Connor 
Simpson, The Steubenville Verdict Is in, and These Boys Are Guilty, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 17, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/steubenville-verdict-guilty/317295 [https://
perma.cc/S94L-7RQU]. See generally Ariel Levy, Trial by Twitter, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/05/trial-by-twitter [https://perma.cc/W4T8-SHWX] 
(describing the long-term impact of Goddard’s intervention on the case and her life). 
 75 Levenson, supra note 72. 
 76 McPhate, supra note 45 (noting that the attack occurred in Columbus, Ohio). O’Brien, Rausch, 
and Shamansky all state that the commonalities between this crime and the Gates-Lonina case are 
purely coincidental. Zoom Interview with Ron J. O’Brien, Prosecutor, Franklin Cnty., Ohio (May 19, 
2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Author-O’Brien Interview]; Zoom Interview with Jennifer M. 
Rausch, Prosecutor, Franklin Cnty., Ohio (May 5, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Author-
Rausch Interview]; Zoom Interview with Samuel H. Shamansky, Crim. Def. Att’y (May 4, 2020) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Author-Shamansky Interview 1]. 
 77 Joe Clark, Men Charged with Live Streaming Their Threat to Shoot Up Neighborhood, NBC 
(May 10, 2016), https://www.nbc4i.com/news/men-charged-with-live-streaming-their-threat-to-shoot-
up-neighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/L6TM-7CG2] (describing the arrests of Yusuf Suliman Conteh 
and Damon Andrew Rosmand after threatening their neighborhood online). 
 78 Clark, supra note 77; McPhate, supra note 45. 
 79 Man in Sweden “Live-Streamed Gang Rape on Facebook,” LOCAL SE (Swe.) (Jan. 22, 2017), 
https://www.thelocal.se/20170122/three-in-sweden-live-streamed-gang-rape-on-facebook [https://
perma.cc/3QSG-WZPL] (describing the rape of the victim who was “close to unconscious” at the 
time); Christina Anderson, Swedish Police Investigate Report of Rape on Facebook Live, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/world/europe/sweden-uppsala-facebook-live-
rape.html [https://perma.cc/2MAF-5GSV]; Jon Sharman, Sweden Gang Rape “Live-Streamed on 
Facebook,” THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
sweden-uppsala-gang-rape-live-streamed-facebook-social-media-three-arrested-a7540176.html [https:
//perma.cc/22WA-4YYL]; Yaron Steinbuch, Suspects in Live-Streamed Gang Rape Are Afghan Im-
migrants, N.Y. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/01/26/afghan-immigrants-busted-for-
live-streamed-gang-rape/ [https://perma.cc/WU32-MXLY] (stating that the rape occurred for three 
hours); Three Men Arrested in Sweden After Facebook Live “Gang-Rape,” THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 
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two hundred online spectators called the police, who stopped the crime as it 
was occurring and arrested the three men.80 
These cases exemplify how social media and mobile devices limit the 
burden on and risk to remote viewers in reporting crimes. If virtual observers 
know relevant details about the crime (such as its location or participants), then 
they are often better positioned than in-person witnesses, without alerting the 
criminals, to contact police, emergency medical services, or others who could 
help. Perpetrators are more likely to be able to identify witnesses who are 
physically present and attack them for potentially or actually alerting authori-
ties. In-person witnesses may also be perilously drawn into the crime itself and 
become victims themselves. 
Like Receivers, Transmitters can be impactful upstanders. Many of these 
examples occur amid police brutality.81 The Black Lives Matter movement has 
called attention to law enforcement abuses in part through sharing photos and 
videos over social media.82 In 2016, a Minnesota police officer fatally shot 
Philando Castile (an African-American man) while Castile’s girlfriend 
livestreamed the encounter over Facebook.83 The broadcast of Castile’s killing 
sparked outrage and demonstrations, which led to a nearly three million dollar 
settlement for Castile’s mother84 and the firing of Castile’s killer.85 More re-
cently, also in Minnesota, a police officer was recorded fatally kneeling on the 
                                                                                                                           
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/three-men-arrested-sweden-facebook-live-
gang-rape-uppsala [https://perma.cc/R46W-56XZ]. 
 80 Compare Facebook Live “Broadcasts Gang Rape” of Woman in Sweden, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38717186 [https://perma.cc/VTE4-CAJC] (identify-
ing Josefine Lundgren as one of the viewers who called the police and noting that she said she could 
see sixty other spectators), with Swedish Police Arrest 3 for Broadcasting Rape Live to Facebook, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/swedish-police-arrest-3-for-broadcasting-
rape-live-to-facebook/a-37246056 [https://perma.cc/6QA4-U3QU] [hereinafter Swedish Police Arrest] 
(also identifying Lundgren and stating that she was among “[s]everal online viewers of the crime 
[who] alerted police”). The Swedish police also noted that local media reported that “[a]bout 200 
people were logged into the closed Facebook group during the assault.” Swedish Police Arrest, supra. 
 81 See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
 82 Katheryn Russell-Brown, Critical Black Protectionism, Black Lives Matter, and Social Media: 
Building a Bridge to Social Justice, 60 HOW. L.J. 367, 406 (2017) (citing the examples of Philando 
Castile, Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, and Walter Scott). 
 83 Matt Furber & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama Calls Police 
Shootings “an American Issue,” N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/
philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/457G-JRY9]. 
 84 Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Family Reaches $3 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/philando-castile-family-settlement.html [https://perma.
cc/ZPG2-46XC]. 
 85 City of St. Anthony Fires Yanez, STAR TRIB. (June 17, 2017), https://www.startribune.com/city-
of-st-anthony-fires-yanez/428935523/ [https://perma.cc/D26V-VAHV] (describing the firing of Of-
ficer Jeronimo Yanez and a related separation agreement). 
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neck of George Floyd, another African-American man.86 The video of Derek 
Chauvin killing Floyd went viral and ignited mass protests across the United 
States and beyond,87 prompting calls for meaningful police reform.88 
Modern technology also facilitates investigations and prosecutions of 
both criminals and bystanders. Through their recorded actions, perpetrators 
provide incriminating (or self-incriminating) evidence.89 And, because of so-
cial media and mobile device users’ digital footprints, identifying witnesses 
may be even easier online than during the analog era.90 
B. Challenges 
The new opportunities social media and mobile devices provide for con-
fronting crime come with challenges. Some of these complications are legal, 
including statutory jurisdiction, prosecutorial discretion, law enforcement, and 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Matt Furber et al., Fatal Encounter Wasn’t First Time Paths Crossed, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2020, at A1 (reporting that the “police officer pressed his knee into Mr. Floyd’s neck in silence, star-
ing toward the ground as his captive gasped repeatedly”). 
 87 Damien Cave et al., Huge Crowds Around the Globe March in Solidarity Against Police Bru-
tality, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/world/george-floyd-global-
protests.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/66KU-57NZ] (describing protests in the wake 
of the Floyd killing in Australia, France, and Germany); John Eligon et al., Appeals for Calm as 
Sprawling Protests Threaten to Spiral out of Control, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/george-floyd-protest-minneapolis.html [https://perma.cc/QZ8P-NPF2] 
(describing demonstrations in more than thirty-six U.S. cities over Floyd’s death). 
 88 John Felipe Acevedo, Essay, Reclaiming Black Dignity, 99 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7–8 
(2020), https://texaslawreview.org/reclaiming-black-dignity/ [https://perma.cc/NV83-WAHA] (advo-
cating for the “ dismantling of the current police state” and creating a police force “beholden to the 
communities they . . . serve”); Brandon Hasbrouck, Essay, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 200, 203 (2020), https://www.uclalawreview.org/
abolishing-racist-policing-with-the-thirteenth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/GES9-7MQU] (propos-
ing abolition of the police to “protect black lives”); Brian Mogck, A Proposal for Police Reform: 
Require Effective Accountability Measures in Police Union Contracts as a Condition of Tax-Exempt 
Status, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3–4, https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/07/police-
unions-mogck/ [https://perma.cc/8F7Z-XJ4R] (arguing that police unions’ tax-exempt status should 
depend on accountability for wrongdoing); Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 
130 YALE L.J. 778, 787 (2021) (supporting a power shift from police to policed communities); Mitch 
Zamoff, Determining the Perspective of a Reasonable Police Officer: An Evidence-Based Proposal, 
65 VILL. L. REV. 585, 585 (2020) (arguing for reform to the “reasonable officer” legal standard); 
Ashley Caldwell, Note, A Force for Change: Effective Police Reform Through State-Level Initiatives, 
45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 597, 608–10 (2020) (arguing for new legislation to increase police accounta-
bility); Derek Hawkins et al., “Defund the Police” Gains Traction as Cities Seek to Respond to De-
mands for a Major Law Enforcement Shift, WASH. POST (June 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/nation/2020/06/07/protests-defund-police/ [https://perma.cc/GY3A-JBHL]. 
 89 Raymond Surette, Performance Crime and Justice, 27 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 195, 204 
(2015). 
 90 Montana, supra note 6, at 557 (“[I]dentifying witnesses . . . might not be as difficult as doing 
so would have been in the past.”); Benzmiller, supra note 7, at 951 n.204, 957, 959. 
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criminal evidence.91 Others are broader, such as content verification, witness 
psychology, upstander risk, and vigilantism.92 
The legal challenges involve technical, ethical, or logistical issues. First, 
modern technology complicates the jurisdiction of Bad Samaritan laws. Digital 
transmission of criminal evidence implicitly raises choice of law questions that 
analog observation does not. For example, if a crime is committed in the same 
jurisdiction in which a Receiver observes it, then the relevant Bad Samaritan 
law is straightforward: any such statute within that jurisdiction could apply to 
the Receiver. If, however, a crime is committed in a different jurisdiction than 
the one in which a Receiver observes it, then the situation is murkier. When 
both jurisdictions have Bad Samaritan laws, which, if any, of the criminal stat-
utes should be applied? The conflict of law would need to be resolved,93 and 
criminal law has particular choice of law considerations and limitations.94 
What if only one of the jurisdictions has a Bad Samaritan law? On the one 
hand, a Bad Samaritan law in the jurisdiction in which the crime is committed 
would not necessarily apply to an out-of-state Receiver because judiciaries, 
including those of U.S. states, typically have jurisdiction only over offenses 
(presumably including violations of Bad Samaritan laws) committed within 
their territory.95 On the other hand, a Bad Samaritan law in the jurisdiction in 
which the crime is witnessed could apply to the Receiver in that state if the law 
covers or could extend to observed out-of-state offenses.96 Courts have not 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See infra notes 93–104 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 105–121 and accompanying text. 
 93 William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality in State Law, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1389, 1422–29 (2020) (describing how U.S. states determine applicable law when those of mul-
tiple jurisdictions could apply). 
94 Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RSRV. L. 
REV. 44, 46 (1974) (citing sovereignty and human rights issues arising in criminal choice of law de-
terminations). 
 95 LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 
321 (1986); Gabriel J. Chin, Policy, Preemption, and Pot: Extraterritorial Citizen Jurisdiction, 58 
B.C. L. REV. 929, 933 (2017) (“The usual basis for state criminal jurisdiction is territorial.”); Dodge, 
supra note 93, at 1405–13 (noting that twenty U.S. states have presumptions against extraterritoriality 
but that those presumptions are sometimes applied inconsistently); B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial 
Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 625–26 (1966) (observing “the triumph of 
the rote of the territorial principle over the pragmatic needs of law enforcement”); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 975 
(2002) (“In common understanding, a state’s law governs its own territory . . . . [And], in general, 
state criminal statutes are territorially limited.”). 
 96 Some law, including some U.S. state law, can be applied extraterritorially. See, e.g., Skiriotes 
v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (determining that a U.S. state may “govern the conduct of its citi-
zens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest and where 
there is no conflict with acts of Congress”); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (“Acts 
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify 
a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should 
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announced choice of law rules for these scenarios or resolved whether Bad 
Samaritan laws apply to offenses committed in other jurisdictions.  
Second, prosecutorial discretion in the digital context is also fraught. 
Where a crime depicted online features multiple Transmitters or Receivers, 
prosecutors may need to prioritize which, if any, individuals to indict and the 
particular offenses they should charge. This prosecutorial discretion promotes 
efficiency,97 but is also susceptible to abuse, including racial discrimination.98 
Third, enforcing Bad Samaritan or other laws against Transmitters and 
Receivers is similarly challenging. Police and prosecutors may lack the re-
sources or time to investigate a potentially enormous number of such individu-
als. Policing and prosecuting crimes depicted online may require coordination 
among law enforcement agencies in multiple jurisdictions, domestic and 
abroad. This liaising can delay or disrupt justice, given differing protocols, 
policies, and priorities.99 
Fourth, even where Bad Samaritan law violations are investigated, evi-
dence of bystanderism could be elusive. It may be difficult or even impossible 
to prove that the owner of a social media account or mobile device is the same 
person who observed crime through it.100 Establishing motive in a Bad Samari-
tan case is especially challenging because it is more difficult to infer intent 
                                                                                                                           
succeed in getting him within its power.”); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 94-166, EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 20–23 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
94-166.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q89-GP4V] (discussing U.S. state criminal laws that apply overseas); 
Chin, supra note 95, at 933–35 (noting situations in which states may convict a person for out-of-state 
conduct, including when the defendant is a citizen of that state); Dodge, supra note 93, at 1413 (listing 
the seventeen U.S. states that do not have a presumption against extraterritoriality); George, supra 
note 95, at 621–28 (comparing state and federal extraterritorial application of law); Julie Rose 
O’Sullivan, The Extraterritorial Application of Federal Criminal Statutes: Analytical Roadmap, Nor-
mative Conclusions, and a Plea to Congress for Direction, 106 GEO. L.J. 1021, 1025 (2018) (observ-
ing that “United States courts currently recognize five principles justifying prescriptive jurisdiction: 
territoriality (subjective and objective), nationality, passive personality, protective, and universal ju-
risdiction”); Sean M. Thornton, State Criminal Laws in Cyberspace: Reconciling Freedom for Users 
with Effective Law Enforcement, 4 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 1 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of constructive 
presence has established a state’s authority to prescribe an out-of-state activity that has in-state ef-
fects.”). 
 97 Montana, supra note 6, at 557 (emphasizing the use of prosecutorial resources in cases that 
send a positive message to the public about complying with Bad Samaritan laws). 
 98 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Admin-
istrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors “are often the final judges 
in their own cases . . . lead[ing] to gross abuses”); David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecu-
tors, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 456 (2018) (contending that prosecutorial discretion results in 
greater racial disparities in the United States). 
 99 Donna Sedgwick & James Hawdon, Interagency Cooperation in the Era of Homeland Policies: 
Are Agencies Answering the Call?, 44 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 178–81 (2018) (discussing challenges 
to interagency activity, such as officials with reputations for being uncooperative). 
 100 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Shamansky Interview 1, supra note 76. 
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from inaction than action.101 Similarly, it may be problematic to determine a 
Transmitter’s or Receiver’s mens rea,102 as a person’s mental state can be hard 
to discern,103 particularly for omissions.104 
In addition to these legal challenges in confronting crime, there are non-
legal challenges associated with modern technology.105 First, assessing the au-
thenticity of electronic content is difficult. In an era of photoshopping, “deep 
fakes,”106 and other digital alteration of audio and visual data, Receivers are 
understandably not always able to gauge genuineness. As a result of this uncer-
tainty, Receivers often do not know whether to intercede or are perhaps apa-
thetic about doing so. As forensic psychologist N.G. Berrill argues about social 
media: “No one has any way of knowing what’s staged, what isn’t staged, and 
in some ways they don’t care.”107 
Second, the psychological effects of social media and mobile devices are 
troubling. This technology may actually condition bystanderism. Legal schol-
                                                                                                                           
 101 Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws, 40 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 982 (2000) (observing that “[i]t is far harder to determine why a person 
does not act”). 
 102 Mens Rea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The state of mind that the prosecu-
tion, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime . . . [for exam-
ple] the mens rea for theft is the intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property.”). 
 103 See Brandon Curtis, Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior: Unintended Consequences and 
Undesirable Results, 2015 BYU. L. REV. 503, 523–24 (“Generally, mens rea is the most difficult 
element of a crime to prove—the higher the culpability, the more difficult it is to prove.”). 
 104 Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 600–07 (1958) (arguing that mens 
rea is especially hard to prove for omissions because the actor may be unaware that they have a duty 
to act). 
 105 See infra notes 106–121 and accompanying text. 
 106 “Deep fakes” are “the full range of hyper-realistic digital falsification of images, video, and 
audio.” Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democra-
cy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2019). For discussion of legal issues aris-
ing from deep fakes, see, for example, Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake 
News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2018) (exploring First Amendment protections for false expression); 
Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay: Deep Fakes and the Chal-
lenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 882, 885 (2019) (consider-
ing the role that the law should play in regulating deep fakes); Chesney & Citron, supra, at 1757–58 
(discussing the creation and implications of deep fakes); Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Deepfakes: More 
Frightening Than Photoshop on Steroids, 58 JUDGES’ J. 35, 38 (2019) (arguing that deep fakes could 
create a dangerous societal skepticism). See generally Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, 
Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892 (2019); Riana 
Pfefferkorn, “Deepfakes” in the Courtroom, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245 (2020); Jessica Silbey & 
Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 MD. L. REV. 960 (2019); Russell Spivak, “Deep-
fakes”: The Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339 (2019). 
107 Cole Kazdin, Psychologists Weigh In on the Teen Who Live-Streamed Her Friend’s Rape, 
VICE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jpyw5k/psychologists-weigh-in-on-the-
teen-who-live-streamed-her-friends-rape [https://perma.cc/6ESL-2QZJ] (quoting N.G. Berrill, a foren-
sic psychologist and the executive director of the New York Center for Neuropsychology and Forensic 
Behavioral Science). 
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ars, psychologists, sociologists, and journalists argue that these voyeuristic 
tools have desensitized users (particularly adolescents and young adults), in-
creased their need and opportunity to obtain validation, and warped their no-
tions of consequences and entertainment.108 Even worse, social media and mo-
bile devices may foment crime. Some individuals violate laws, or at least do so 
in a performative way, precisely because they know they have an audience.109 
Rape, drag racing, dogfighting, and bullying are notorious examples of such 
circumstances.110 Even passive, silent spectators may implicitly encourage cer-
tain types of crime.111 
Third, witnesses who record or report crimes may incur risk, whether 
from perpetrators, victims, witnesses, or even uninvolved parties. The individ-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Montana, supra note 6, at 536 (“As technology advances, relationships have become increas-
ingly impersonal, thereby wearing at an individual’s connection to and compassion for others.”); 
Kazdin, supra note 107. Professor Patricia Grande Montana argues that “[s]ocial media dominates 
personal relationships and interactions with others and the community. Unsurprisingly, this domi-
nance has influenced bystander behavior, leading to an increase in apathy when observing crimes 
online or witnessing tragedies firsthand.” Montana, supra note 6, at 558. Similarly, Uelmen argues 
that internet subculture “has become so desensitized to violence that observers barely flinch when 
taking out their cameras and hitting record,” and quotes a journalist’s observation that a viral video of 
an assault “serves as a perfect example of how violence becomes instant entertainment these days.” 
Uelmen, supra note 8, at 79–80 (quoting John Del Signore, Police Seek 3 Men for Beating L Train 
Rider Who Scolded Them for Spitting, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 16, 2011), https://gothamist.com/news/
police-seek-3-men-for-beating-l-train-rider-who-scolded-them-for-spitting [https://perma.cc/HCY9-
6J3S]). She concludes that “bystanders are extracting voyeuristic pleasure from another person’s pain 
and need for emergency assistance.” Id. at 80–81. 
 109 ELIZABETH YARDLEY, SOCIAL MEDIA HOMICIDE CONFESSIONS 1 (2017) (defining “perfor-
mance crime” as “a crime enacted for the camera”); Surette, supra note 89, at 199 (defining 
“[c]ontemporary performance crime” as “the spectacle of recording, sharing, and uploading crime in 
order to distribute the performance to new media audiences”); Kazdin, supra note 107 (quoting Direc-
tor of the Media Psychology Research Center Pamela Rutledge’s statement that “[m]ost of the crimi-
nals who get caught for posting their crimes are exercising bravado to show their importance[,] a digi-
tal ‘nah nah nah—you can’t catch me’”). 
 110 Allen, supra note 5, at 839 (“Social science literature has recognized for decades that gang 
rape is inherently a group crime and is a medium for the group members, both the rapists and specta-
tors, to interact with one another. Because the objective of a gang rape is to perform sexually in front 
of an audience, the audience is a key motivating factor in the crime.”); Katharine K. Baker, Once a 
Rapist? Motivation Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 606 (1997) (“Men 
often rape women to demonstrate their strength, virulence, and masculinity to other men. For these 
men, having an audience is critical; intercourse is instrumental.”); Benzmiller, supra note 7, at 931, 
952 (“Peer bystanders are important to the bullying dynamic because bullying is essentially a public 
display from which bullies derive power. . . . [B]ystanders by their very presence ‘act’ in the sense of 
providing support and encouragement to the bully.”). Attorney Kimberley K. Allen’s article specifi-
cally analyzes gang rapes, dog fighting, and drag racing as “audience-oriented crimes” that spectators 
“encourage and motivate.” Allen, supra note 5, at 841–51. 
 111 Allen, supra note 5, at 839 (“Though it is wrong to fail to contact police, the greater wrong is 
the decision to watch and, through that approving presence, to encourage the rape.”); Benzmiller, 
supra note 7, at 931 (arguing that bystanders who are “merely passive observers . . . encourage bully-
ing by providing attention”). 
1138 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1117 
uals who filmed the police killings of George Floyd112 and Eric Garner113 both 
suffered harassment. Worse yet, observers who have documented “atrocity 
crimes”114 in Syria have been arrested, injured, or killed.115 Given that police 
and other officials can and have escalated situations, sometimes fatally,116 wit-
nesses may be understandably reluctant to alert authorities. 
Finally, crimes depicted online may inspire “digital vigilantism,” or the 
“process where citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and 
coordinate retaliation on mobile devices and social platforms.”117 These re-
sponses include investigating, “doxing,”118 or more directly intervening. For 
example, computer hackers associated with Anonymous and Knightsec inter-
ceded in the Steubenville case by publicly naming the suspected rapists and 
bystanders.119 Some digital vigilantes may be misguided or cause more harm 
than good, indicating that they are not altruistic or helpful upstanders. After the 
bombing at the Boston Marathon in 2013, for instance, Reddit and Twitter us-
ers wrongly accused Sunil Tripathi of being one of the suspects, damaging his 
reputation, inspiring threats against his family, and distracting from the real 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Elly Belle, The Traumatized 17-Year-Old Who Filmed George Floyd’s Killing Is Already 
Being Harassed, REFINERY29 (May 29, 2020), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/05/9846485/
darnella-frazier-filmed-george-floyd-death-harassment [https://perma.cc/UW7G-5YKE] (noting that 
Darnella Frazier, the woman who filmed Floyd’s death, has faced online criticism since the event). 
 113 Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New York Police, 
TIME (July 23, 2014), https://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-chokehold-death/ [https://
perma.cc/ZE3S-M3QE] (describing how Ramsey Orta, who filmed Garner’s death, “says that officers 
have harassed him since the Garner video became public”). 
 114 See David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229, 
229 (2006) (proposing the term “atrocity crimes” to collectively describe “genocide, crimes against 
humanity (including ethnic cleansing), and war crimes”). 
 115 BETH VAN SCHAACK, IMAGINING JUSTICE FOR SYRIA 390 (2020); Hamilton, supra note 65, at 37. 
 116 See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental Health, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 647 (2016) (describing the controversial police killing of Laquan McDon-
ald, a black teenager); Matthew James Enzweiler, Note, Swatting Political Discourse: A Domestic 
Terrorism Threat, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2001, 2002, 2030 (2015) (describing “swatting” as “mak-
ing fraudulent 911 calls and reporting threats or ongoing violent situations in order to draw a response 
from law enforcement, usually a SWAT team,” which creates “a substantial risk of a mistaken use of 
force” by the victim or law enforcement). 
 117 Daniel Trottier, Digital Vigilantism as Weaponisation of Visibility, 30 PHIL. & TECH. 55, 55 
(2017) (defining “digital vigilantism” and advocating for research in this area). 
 118 “Doxing” refers to “the action of finding or publishing private information about someone on 
the internet without their permission, especially in a way that reveals their name, address, etc.” Dox-
ing, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/doxing [https://
perma.cc/4Q8Y-TDY6]. For discussion of legal issues arising from doxing, see, for example, Alexan-
der J. Lindvall, Political Hacktivism: Doxing & the First Amendment, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 2 
(2019) (proposing anti-doxing statutes and arguing that they would survive First Amendment chal-
lenges); Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy for the Malicious Pub-
lication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2454–55 (2017) (reviewing the merits 
of enacted and proposed anti-doxing legislation). 
 119 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1367, 1378. 
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culprits.120 Likewise, two years earlier, another group of self-appointed internet 
sleuths falsely accused Edward Jordan of killing kittens online; he committed 
suicide soon thereafter.121 
Many of the opportunities and challenges for bystanderism and up-
standerism in the modern era that this Part has described are illustrated in the 
Gates-Lonina case, which is summarized in the following Part122 and analyzed 
in Part III.123 
II. THE GATES-LONINA CASE 
“I was having fun.”124 So said the person who livestreamed the sexual as-
sault of a third party in 2016,125 in what was reportedly the first act of its kind 
(at least in the United States).126 On February 27 of that year,127 twenty-nine-
                                                                                                                           
 120 Jay Caspian Kang, Crowd-Sourcing a Smear, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 28, 2013, at 36–38 (de-
tailing the online false rumor of Tripathi’s involvement in the Boston Marathon bombing and the 
subsequent harm this rumor caused). 
 121 Bill Jensen, Animal Instinct: How Cat-Loving Sleuths Found an Accused Killer Sadist, ROLL-
ING STONE (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/animal-instinct-how-
cat-loving-sleuths-found-an-accused-killer-sadist-111273/ [https://perma.cc/6HUX-ZQH9] (stating 
that, by January 8, 2011, internet sleuths believed the culprit was Jamsey Cramsalot Inhisass); Rod 
McPhee, Game of Cat & Mouse, THE SUN (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/
10574296/netflix-luka-magnotta-tracked-cat-lovers/ [https://perma.cc/9N79-JWXV] (describing the 
online vigilante investigation of Luka Magnotta that led to Jordan’s suicide); TeresaY, The Forgotten 
Man in “Don’t F**k with Cats: Hunting an Internet Killer,” UNIV. OF MICH. SI 410 ETHICS & INFO. 
TECH. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://si410.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-forgotten-man-in-dont-fk-with-cats.
html [https://perma.cc/K9ZR-A4V9] (noting on class blog that Jamsey was an alias for Edward Jor-
dan). 
 122 See infra notes 124–170 and accompanying text. 
 123 See infra notes 171–398 and accompanying text. 
 124 Interview by Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police with Marina Lonina, (Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter 
CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript]. 
 125 Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police, Case Report Number 163049068-001, Criminal Investigation 
Summary (Apr. 5, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter CPD Summary 2016.04.05]; (containing the 
CPD’s summary of the case); see also Hot Girls Wanted: Turned On: Don’t Stop Filming (Netflix 
Apr. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Don’t Stop Filming] (quoting Lonina). 
126 Close, Lonina, and O’Brien all believe that this case was the first of its kind, at least in the 
United States. See Peter Holley, ‘She Got Caught Up in the Likes’: Teen Accused of Live-Streaming 
Friend’s Rape for Attention, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2016/04/19/she-got-caught-up-in-the-likes-teen-accused-of-livestreaming-friends-
rape-for-attention/ [https://perma.cc/6YY4-UNC4] (quoting O’Brien’s statement); McPhate, supra 
note 45 (quoting O’Brien’s statement that, “I have never seen a case such as this where you would 
actually live-stream a sexual assault”); Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125 (quoting Lonina stating: 
“As we were told, this is the first case in history,” and quoting O’Brien stating that, “[t]his was the 
first case that I was aware of involving the use of the Periscope app to record the actual commission of 
a crime”); Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Zoom Interview with Brent A. Close, Police 
Officer, Columbus, Ohio (May 13, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Author-Close Interview] 
(stating that the Gates-Lonina case was the first time that authorities were alerted about a sexual crime 
livestreamed by a third party). 
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year-old Raymond Boyd Gates raped a seventeen-year-old girl identified in 
court documents as “D.B.”128 The victim’s supposed best friend,129 eighteen-
year-old Marina Alexeevna Lonina, broadcasted the rape in real time via Peri-
scope,130 a live video-streaming application.131 
Lonina did not call the police.132 Nor did she leave the scene of the crime 
to seek help. Rather, she recorded a video, which more than 700 people report-
edly watched live.133 During the incident, D.B. cried134 and screamed135 while 
Lonina smiled136 and laughed.137 Lonina pulled D.B.’s leg while the victim 
pleaded “no,” “stop,” and “help me.”138 When D.B. requested that the two of 
them leave, Lonina told her that she wanted to smoke first.139 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police, Case Report Number: 163049068-001, Case Report (Feb. 29, 
2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter CPD Case Report] (indicating that the rape occurred on Febru-
ary 27, 2016). 
 128 Indictment at 1, State v. Lonina, No. 16CR 1992 (Franklin Cnty. C.P., Apr. 12, 2016). Accord-
ing to the assistant prosecutor in the case, Jennifer Rausch, “D.B.” are the victim’s initials. Author-
Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 129 Multiple sources refer to Lonina and D.B. as friends. The victim called Lonina her friend. 
Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police, Case Report Number: 163049068-001, Informational Summary #1: 
Interview of Victim (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter CPD-Victim Interview]. Lonina 
called the victim her “friend.” Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125. The CPD also described the two 
individuals as friends. CPD Summary 2016.04.05, supra note 125. The Reporter characterizes Lonina 
and D.B. as “best friends.” Skype Interview with the Anonymous Reporter in the Gates-Lonina case 
(Apr. 13, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Author-Reporter Interview 1]. 
 130 Periscope is a live video streaming app co-founded by Kayvon Beykpour and Joe Bernstein in 
2014. Alyson Shontell, What It’s Like to Sell Your Startup for ~$120 Million Before It’s Even 
Launched: Meet Twitter’s New Prized Possession, Periscope, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2015), https://
www.businessinsider.com/what-is-periscope-and-why-twitter-bought-it-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/
RP86-6G5M]; About Us, PERISCOPE, https://www.periscope.tv/about [https://perma.cc/E23C-9QP6]. 
Twitter acquired Periscope the following year. Shontell, supra. 
 131 McPhate, supra note 45. I have not personally viewed any recording or still images of 
Lonina’s livestreams on either February 26 or 27, 2016. Viewing such material, which constitutes 
child pornography, is criminal. Rather, I rely on descriptions in the police file and from my interview-
ees. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126 (quoting Close that “there were over 700 at one 
point”); Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46 (quoting the Reporter that there were “706 or 
707” viewers). 
 134 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 135 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126 (“[T]he victim was screaming . . . .”); Author-
Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 136 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 137 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. O’Brien stated: “For the most part [Lonina] is 
just streaming [the rape] on the Periscope app and giggling and laughing.” McPhate, supra note 45. 
 138 Holley, supra note 126; McPhate, supra note 45; Author-Close Interview, supra note 126 
(describing that, during the livestream, Gates “is on top of the victim and she clearly is telling him to 
stop,” saying “[n]o”); Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 139 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
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Lonina posed for—and encouraged the audience to take—screenshots,140 
spurred spectators to recruit additional viewers,141 and prodded audience 
members to add her as a friend and follow her on Periscope.142 The incident 
has been characterized as “social media’s Kitty Genovese moment,”143 a refer-
ence to the infamous 1964 Genovese case.144 Unlike that tragedy, in which all 
witnesses were either passive or tried to help,145 in the Gates-Lonina case the 
only physically present witness (Lonina) actively engaged in the crime (quali-
fying her as a perpetrator). 
Gates committed the sexual assault against D.B. in Ohio,146 one of the 
twenty-nine U.S. states with Bad Samaritan laws (then and now).147 Indeed, 
Ohio is one of seven U.S. states that features multiple Bad Samaritan laws.148 
One of Ohio’s Bad Samaritan laws (“Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law”) 
makes it a crime for anyone “knowing that a felony has been or is being com-
mitted, [to] knowingly fail to report such information to law enforcement au-
thorities.”149 This law required Lonina (and possibly others) to notify the po-
lice about the rape.150 The relevant legislative history indicates that the Ohio 
legislature’s purpose in enacting this law was crime prevention and law en-
forcement.151 The drafters intended for the statute to be similar to but narrower 
than the common law crime of misprision of felony.152 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 141 E-mail from the Reporter, to John Pietanza, N.Y. Police Dep’t Sergeant (Mar. 2, 2016) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Reporter E-mail to Pietanza] (“[W]hen [the victim] was calling for help[,] 
her friend, Marina [Lonina], was saying ‘guys (viewers) call your friends! (to watch this video[]).’”). 
142 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 143 Stephen Marche, We’re Witnessing Social Media’s Kitty Genovese Moment, ESQUIRE (Apr. 21, 
2016), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a44153/marina-lonina-periscope-rape/ [https://
perma.cc/ZK9G-7BWE]. 
 144 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For discussion of the Genovese case, including its 
disputed facts and interpretations as well as its consequences, see Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1349–52. 
 145 At least two people (Joseph Fink and Karl Ross) saw the crime occur, understood its true na-
ture, and chose not to do anything until too late, and three people (Sophia Farrar, Samuel Hoffman, 
and Robert Mozer) tried to help. Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1350–51; Kaufman, What Makes People 
Save Lives?, supra note 13 (describing Farrar’s decision to leave the safety of her apartment to assist 
Genovese). 
 146 McPhate, supra note 45. 
 147 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 148 The other six states are: Alaska, Florida, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washing-
ton. Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1347. 
 149 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (West 2020). 
 150 See id. In Ohio, rape is a felony. Id. § 2907.02(B) (designating rape as a felony of the first 
degree). None of the exceptions to this duty-to-report law applied to Lonina reporting Gates’s rape. 
See id. § 2921.22(G) (listing circumstances that “do not require disclosure of information,” including 
familial and clergy exceptions). 
 151 OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, COMMITTEE COMMENT TO H 511 (1973) (“The rationale for 
requiring that serious crimes be reported is that effective crime prevention and law enforcement de-
pend significantly on the cooperation of the public. The section covers, for example, the situation 
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The state’s other Bad Samaritan law (“Ohio’s specific Bad Samaritan 
law”), which is a “mandatory reporter law,”153 makes it a crime for particular 
professionals (such as attorneys, physicians, and school employees) who are 
acting in an official or professional capacity not to report known or reasonably 
suspected abuse or neglect of any person under eighteen years of age or of a 
developmentally disabled or physically impaired individual younger than 
twenty-one years old.154 That law required the listed specialists to report the 
abuse to a designated agency or peace officer.155 Like mandatory reporter laws 
elsewhere,156 the Ohio legislature designed its specific Bad Samaritan law to 
enhance cooperation between law enforcement and professionals most likely to 
detect mistreatment of particularly vulnerable people.157 
Only one viewer of Lonina’s livestream—an eighteen-year-old in New 
York (the Reporter), who was Lonina’s former best friend158—notified law 
                                                                                                                           
where bystanders ignore a murder victim’s pleas for help because they do not want to ‘become in-
volved.’”). 
152 Id. Specifically, the drafters stated: 
The gist of misprision at common law was keeping silence or failing to attempt to ap-
prehend the offender when one knew a felony had been committed. . . . Under this sec-
tion, persons are required only to inform authorities of felonies of which they have 
knowledge, and are not required to attempt apprehension of the offender. Also, a num-
ber of relationships are privileged under this section which were not privileged at com-
mon law. 
Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the history of misprision of a felony). 
 153 Mandatory reporter laws (also known as “mandatory reporting laws”) require certain people to 
report particular misconduct, including child abuse. Leonard G. Brown, III & Kevin Gallagher, Man-
datory Reporting of Abuse: A Historical Perspective on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory 
Reporting Laws with a Review of the Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. 
ONLINE: TOLLE LEGE 37, 37–38 (2013), https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=3262&context=vlr [https://perma.cc/KS36-TSZT] (describing the history of mandatory 
reporting laws in the context of child abuse). Such statutes have been enacted in all fifty U.S. states. 
Jonathan Todres, Can Mandatory Reporting Laws Help Child Survivors of Human Trafficking?, 2016 
WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 69, 70, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/media/80495 [https://perma.
cc/57PZ-U6U2]. 
 154 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421. The crime in the Gates-Lonina case (rape) would qualify 
as this law’s subject matter (abuse or neglect) and the victim’s age (seventeen) would qualify for this 
law’s victim age restriction. See id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See, e.g., id. (requiring attorneys and other professionals to report abuse to peace officers); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A(a)–(b) (2021) (requiring mandated reporters, such as medical staff 
and members of school faculty, to report child abuse to the department of children and families). 
 157 Mario C. Ciano, Recent Legislation: Ohio’s Mandatory Reporting Statute for Cases of Child 
Abuse, 18 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1405, 1407–08 (1967) (stating that Ohio’s mandatory reporting 
law is similar to that of other states but is broader in scope than many states). 
 158 The Reporter stated that she and Lonina were “best friends” while they were both first-year 
students at a high school in Brooklyn, New York. Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
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enforcement.159 Police then arrested Lonina on March 3, 2016,160 and Gates 
exactly one month later.161 Neither Lonina nor anyone else was charged with 
violating a Bad Samaritan law for the events of either February 26 or 27, 
2016.162 Rather, prosecutors charged both Lonina and Gates with seven counts 
(all felonies): one count of kidnapping, two counts of rape, one count of sexual 
battery, and three counts of pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a mi-
nor.163 Lonina was also charged with two counts of illegal use of a minor in 
nudity-oriented material or performance for images she took of D.B. the night 
before the rape,164 during which Lonina livestreamed via Periscope D.B. par-
tially naked.165 
Gates and Lonina both initially pleaded not guilty.166 On October 12, 
2016, Gates pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to nine years imprison-
ment.167 Four months later, Lonina pleaded guilty to one count of pandering 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Holley, supra note 126 (“O’Brien said authorities became aware of the incident when a friend 
of the victim saw the images and alerted police.”); McPhate, supra note 45; Sade Strehlke, How a 
Digital Bystander Intervened When She Saw a 17-Year-Old’s Rape Live Streamed on Periscope, TEEN 
VOGUE (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/17-year-old-rape-live-streamed-periscope 
[https://perma.cc/JCX7-BD8Z]; Telephone Interview by Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police with the 
Reporter (Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter CPD-Reporter Interview]. 
 160 Indictment, supra note 128, at 5; CPD Summary 2016.04.05, supra note 125; Columbus, Ohio 
Div. of Police, Case Report Number 163049068-001, Arrest Information – Marina Lonina (Mar. 3, 
2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter CPD Arrest Information – Lonina]; Columbus, Ohio Div. of 
Police, Case Report Number 163049068-001, Progress of Investigation (Apr. 5, 2016) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter CPD Investigation Progress 2016.04.05]. 
 161 Indictment, supra note 128, at 6; Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police, Case Report Number 
163049068-001, Arrest Information – Raymond Gates (Apr. 3, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
CPD Arrest Information – Gates]; see CPD Summary 2016.04.05, supra note 125 (stating that Gates 
was arrested on April 3, 2016); CPD Investigation Progress 2016.04.05, supra note 160 (same). 
 162 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76; see infra 
notes 183–186 (describing how Lonina livestreamed a naked, vomiting, and intoxicated D.B. the day 
before the rape). 
 163 Indictment, supra note 128, at 1–3; CPD Arrest Information – Gates, supra note 161; CPD 
Arrest Information – Lonina, supra note 160. 
 164 McPhate, supra note 45. 
 165 Indictment, supra note 128, at 3–4; CPD Summary 2016.04.05, supra note 125; Columbus, 
Ohio Div. of Police, Case Report Number 163049068-001, Informational Summary #6: Interview of 
Suspect Marina Lonina (Mar. 3, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter CPD-Lonina Interview – 
Summary]; Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 166 Marina Lonina Pleads Not Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
video/us/100000004336260/marina-lonina-pleads-not-guilty.html [https://perma.cc/5XNR-J5TE]; An-
drew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Teen Pleads Not Guilty to Livestreaming Friend’s Rape, NBC NEWS (Apr. 
19, 2016), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/national-international/ohio-teen-pleads-not-guilty-to-
livestreaming-friends-rape/2003439/ [https://perma.cc/8Y7A-XUDT]; E-mail from Jennifer Rausch, 
Legal Dir., Hum. Trafficking Initiative, Ohio Att’y Gen.’s Off., to the Author (June 4, 2020, 11:27 
AM) (on file with author). 
 167 Judgment Entry at 1, State v. Lonina, No. 16CR 1992 (Franklin Cnty. C.P., Oct. 12, 2016), 
ECF No. 0A650-E32. The prosecution dismissed the other charges against Gates. Id. 
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sexually-oriented matter involving a minor, as amended to obstructing justice 
(a lesser included offense), and was sentenced to nine months imprisonment.168 
She has already served her sentence.169 
The Gates-Lonina case presents multiple puzzles that the next Part seeks 
to solve. Why did Lonina livestream her supposed best friend’s rape? Why did 
one—but only one—of the hundreds of Receivers report the crime to police? 
Why was neither Lonina nor anyone else charged with violating either of 
Ohio’s Bad Samaritan laws? Should or even could anyone else have been so 
charged? Because the Gates-Lonina case represents an increasingly common 
situation in the digital age, the episode reveals deficiencies in how Bad Sa-
maritan laws are currently designed and operate and why the recommendations 
in Part IV170 would help promote justice and accountability. 
III. GOOD AND BAD SAMARITANS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
This Part identifies and analyzes two types of third parties in the digital 
age—Transmitters and Receivers (as well as their subtypes)—and the actors in 
the Gates-Lonina case who do or may qualify as each.171 The following Part 
will propose a hierarchy of liability within this typology.172 
A. Transmitters 
This Section describes Transmitters generally and then analyzes the only 
Transmitter in the Gates-Lonina case: Lonina herself. 
1. Transmitters Generally 
Transmitters are witnesses who are physically present at the scene of a 
crime and share evidence of the offense electronically, such as through email, 
social media, mobile devices, or landline phones. This evidence may be sounds 
(including spoken words), written communication (for example, through text 
messaging, emailing, or commenting on social media), photographs, or videos 
(whether recordings or livestreams). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, this Article’s typology divides Transmitters 
across two dimensions (conduct and timing), both of which are further divided 
into subtypes. Transmitters may engage in any of three subtypes of conduct. 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Id.; see Entry of Guilty Plea, Lonina, No. 16CR 1992 (Oct. 12, 2016), ECF No. 0A650-D30. 
The prosecution dismissed the other charges against Lonina. Judgment Entry, Lonina, No. 16CR 1992 
(Feb. 13, 2017), ECF No. 0A713-R84. 
 169 Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 170 See infra notes 399–479 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 174–398 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 399–479 and accompanying text. 
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First, “Upstander Transmitters” intervene helpfully, for example, by attempting 
to assist the person in distress directly or by notifying authorities. Second, 
“Enabler Transmitters” intervene harmfully, for instance, by facilitating or ex-
acerbating a depicted crime. Third, “Bystander Transmitters” do not intervene 
at all. 
 Additionally, there are two subtypes of Transmitters based on the timing 
of the Transmitter’s acts or omissions. First, “Contemporaneous Transmitters” 
share evidence of a crime as it is occurring. Second, “Delayed Transmitters” 
share evidence of a crime after it has taken place. 
 Transmitter subtypes within dimensions are mutually exclusive; a Trans-
mitter can only be a Bystander, Upstander, or Enabler, and only Contempora-
neous or Delayed. In contrast, subtypes across dimensions are not mutually 
exclusive; for example, a Transmitter could be an Upstander and Delayed (as 
in Figure 1’s cell 2). 
FIGURE 1. Typology of Digital Age Samaritans: Transmitters* 
 
Regardless of subtype, Transmitters may have different motives for their 
conduct. Those intentions—which bear on Transmitters’ culpability, as will be 
discussed173—could be benevolent, malevolent, mixed, or neutral. Selflessly, 
Transmitters could be trying to prevent or stop a crime, or at least preserve ev-
idence of it. Selfishly, Transmitters could be seeking attention, validation, ex-
citement, or money.174 Spitefully, Transmitters could be attempting to humili-
ate the victim. 
                                                                                                                           
 *NOTE: Because some platforms do not reproduce images, we have archived all graphics herein at 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/62-4/kaufman_
graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8MS-Z2LD]. 
 173 See infra notes 194–249 (discussing the motives for transmitters and assessing Lonina’s mo-
tives for her conduct). 
 174 For example, the executive director of the New York Center for Neuropsychology and Foren-
sic Behavioral Science, N.G. Berrill, stated about Transmitters: 
You can put it online immediately. People don’t feel like there are any repercussions 
. . . . In some sick way, there’s some satisfaction in having your ‘work’ be consumed by 
all these people, being told that they like it. Something terrible becomes another form of 
entertainment, even if it’s real and horrible. 
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In jurisdictions with Bad Samaritan laws, prosecutors could charge 
Transmitters with violations of those statutes. As such witnesses must be phys-
ically present to broadcast the event, they are likely aware of the crime. 
Transmitters could mount various defenses against Bad Samaritan viola-
tion charges. First, they could claim to be what I have identified elsewhere as 
“Unaware Bystanders,” a type of bystander that does not act because they do 
not perceive the true nature of a situation as a crime.175 This defense could be 
compelling in some cases, best demonstrated through an example. Consider a 
person livestreaming a walk through the woods. The person hears a rustling 
but does not suspect anything sinister. The mobile device, which the person 
was pointing in multiple directions, broadcasts audio and video of the disturb-
ance: a murder. The Transmitter, who did not know the sound’s source, could 
qualify in this scenario as an Unaware Bystander. 
Second, Transmitters could raise a defense by claiming that they were at-
tempting to discourage an assailant or preserve evidence and that their conduct 
discharged any duty under the statute. These individuals may have trouble 
proving either intention or, where Bad Samaritan laws require reporting to spe-
cific individuals (e.g., law enforcement), that they fulfilled such a condition. In 
any case, the evidentiary or deterrent value of knowingly livestreaming, in par-
ticular, a sexual assault may not outweigh the societal interest in protecting the 
victim’s identity.176 
2. Marina Lonina as a Transmitter 
In the Gates-Lonina case, Lonina qualifies as a Contemporaneous Trans-
mitter because, while physically present when Gates raped D.B., Lonina 
livestreamed the crime.177 Although Lonina pleaded guilty to obstructing jus-
tice, her actions (and omissions), mental state, and intent bear closer scrutiny 
to understand the role Transmitters may play, the culpability they may shoul-
der, and whether Lonina herself qualifies as a Bystander, Upstander, or Enabler 
Transmitter.178 This subsection analyzes Lonina’s actus reus, mens rea, and 
                                                                                                                           
Kazdin, supra note 107. Transmitters may be rewarded with “the possibility of being instantaneously 
famous,” becoming an “automatic celebrity,” or, if the situation is violent or dangerous, boosting their 
“street cred.” Uelmen, supra note 8, at 80 (quoting Abby Phillip, Worldstar and the Lure of Internet 
Fame That Drives Teens to Film Brutal Assaults, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/16/worldstar-and-the-lure-of-internet-fame-that-
drives-teens-to-film-brutal-assaults/ [https://perma.cc/3FC7-V2NY]). 
 175 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1376–78 (arguing that Unaware Bystanders should be excused from 
liability under a Bad Samaritan law). 
 176 Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 177 McPhate, supra note 45 (stating that Lonina was present during the rape and livestreamed the 
event over Periscope). 
 178 See supra note 166 and accompanying text (detailing Lonina’s guilty plea). 
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motive, and also why she was not charged with violating either of Ohio’s Bad 
Samaritan laws.179 The subsection concludes that Lonina was a Contempora-
neous Enabler Transmitter.180 
a. Actus Reus181 
Lonina’s conduct in late-February 2016, as a constituent element of any 
offenses she committed during that time, compels closer inspection. Her ac-
tions and omissions suggest criminality, including probably violating Ohio’s 
general Bad Samaritan law.182 
On February 26, 2016, the day before the rape, Lonina and D.B. initially 
met Gates, who gave them a bottle of alcohol to take home.183 That evening, 
while Lonina and D.B. were at Lonina’s home, Lonina livestreamed via Peri-
scope D.B. naked and vomiting.184 According to the Reporter, who watched the 
livestream, Lonina recorded herself undressing D.B. while the latter was intox-
icated.185 D.B. would not learn of this video until after Gates sexually assaulted 
her.186 
The following day, while Lonina and D.B. were at Gates’s home, Lonina 
livestreamed Gates raping D.B.187 Lonina and Gates both told police that Gates 
knew Lonina was recording their encounter.188 During the broadcast, Lonina 
engaged with her audience by smiling, laughing, posing, and encouraging them 
to take screenshots and recruit additional viewers.189 In addition, according to 
the Reporter, Lonina poured vodka into D.B.’s mouth while Gates was on top 
of her.190 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See infra notes 181–277 and accompanying text. 
 180 See supra Figure 1 (listing Contemporaneous Enabler Transmitters in cell 3). 
 181 Actus reus is “[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and that 
generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability; a forbidden act.” Actus Reus, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 102. 
 182 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2020) (“[N]o person, knowing that a felo-
ny has been or is being committed, shall knowingly fail to report such information to law enforcement 
authorities.”). 
 183 CPD Summary 2016.04.05, supra note 125. 
 184 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; CPD-Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165. 
 185 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 186 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 187 McPhate, supra note 45. 
 188 CPD-Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165 (“[Lonina] asked [Gates] if he had an 
objection to her Periscoping their interaction. [Gates] stated that it was okay for her to Periscope.”); 
Interview by Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police with Suspect Raymond Gates (Apr. 3, 2016) (on file with 
author) (Gates “recounted that [Lonina] was in the room at the time” and stated “that he was aware 
that [Lonina] was video-recording[.]”). 
 189 See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
 190 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
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Although Lonina did not call 911 or otherwise alert authorities about the 
crime, she did claim in a police interview to have done at least three things to 
try to help D.B. Specifically, Lonina stated that she asked D.B. “if she was 
okay,” which D.B. supposedly answered in the affirmative; Lonina allegedly 
also asked D.B. “if she needed help,” which Lonina claimed D.B. answered 
with “I don’t know” and otherwise “did not give [Lonina] a ‘straight answer;’” 
and Lonina said that she ultimately convinced D.B. to leave Gates’s home.191 
Later, even Lonina dropped the pretense of having tried to help D.B. 
Lonina subsequently admitted “not doing anything . . . to stop” the rape.192 
Likewise, O’Brien, the case’s lead prosecutor, stated that Lonina “did nothing 
to aid the victim.”193 
b. Motive and Mens Rea 
Lonina’s motive and mens rea directly bear on whether she was an ena-
bler, bystander, or upstander. Like her conduct, her intent and mental state sug-
gest criminality, including probably violating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan 
law.194 
Lonina’s defense attorney, Shamansky, alternated between portraying 
Lonina’s intentions and mental state as innocent and criminal. Initially, Sham-
ansky claimed that Lonina was trying to aid D.B. by preventing or stopping the 
rape,195 extricating the victim,196 and preserving evidence of the crime.197 (As 
such, Shamansky originally portrayed Lonina as an Upstander Transmitter.) 
Later, Shamansky acknowledged that Lonina had committed a felony, for 
which she should be—and was—punished.198 
                                                                                                                           
 191 CPD-Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165. 
 192 Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125. 
 193 William Cummings, Teen Pleads Not Guilty to Livestreaming Friend’s Rape, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/04/16/teen-charged-ivestreaming-
rape/83117856/ [https://perma.cc/2XT5-U427] (quoting O’Brien). O’Brien also stated, “Based on the 
video that I saw it didn’t appear for the most part of it that [Lonina] was attempting to help the vic-
tim.” Holley, supra note 126. 
 194 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2020) (criminalizing knowing failure to 
report a felony to law enforcement). 
 195 McPhate, supra note 45 (“Mr. Shamansky, who has viewed the Periscope video, said Ms. 
Lonina made ‘substantial’ efforts to thwart the attack, though he declined to specify them.”). 
 196 Shamansky claimed: “We watched [the video Lonina made]. At various times, she’s trying to 
get her friend out of there.” Marina Lonina Pleads Not Guilty, supra note 166. 
 197 Shamansky stated that, “[A]s [Lonina] immediately told the police, she was filming in order to 
preserve, not to embarrass or to shame or to titillate anybody.” McPhate, supra note 45. 
 198 Shamansky conceded that Lonina committed a felony when “there was some degree of ob-
struction [of justice] with the videos maybe not turned over right away [by Lonina to investigators].” 
Telephone Interview with Samuel H. Shamansky, Crim. Def. Att’y (Jan. 11, 2021) (on file with au-
thor). Shamansky also stated: “We believe punishment is appropriate. We believe a felony is appro-
priate for this conduct.” Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125. Lonina has served her nine-month im-
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Lonina herself claimed all three of the explanations that her counsel 
did,199 mirroring his initial suggestion that she was an Upstander Transmitter. 
She also claimed two other reasons: imprudence and ignorance. Lonina im-
plied that poor judgment, rather than malice, led her to be passive, stating: “I 
was stupid for not calling anybody and for not doing anything . . . to stop it.”200 
She also asserted that she did not think that Gates was raping D.B., effectively 
suggesting that her failure to report the crime did not satisfy the Ohio general 
Bad Samaritan law’s required mens rea of “knowing.”201 More specifically, 
Lonina claimed that such assaults “always” happen in private. 202 In contrast, 
she argued, this situation was public, given the presence of Lonina and Gates’s 
roommate in the house and that Gates knew that she was livestreaming.203 
Lonina’s argument fails on multiple grounds. First, she is factually wrong 
that rape can only occur in a private setting, either in Ohio or generally.204 Sec-
                                                                                                                           
prisonment sentence and has been released without supervision. Author-Shamansky Interview 1, su-
pra note 76. 
 199 Kazdin, supra note 107 (quoting O’Brien’s statement about Lonina: “When she was inter-
viewed by the police, she said originally she thought that by live-streaming or taping it, it would pre-
vent the assailant from doing what he actually was doing before her very eyes . . . .”); Ohio Teen 
Claims She Livestreamed 10-Minute Rape for “Evidence,” CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/ohio-teen-claims-she-livestreamed-10-minute-rape-for-evidence/ [https://perma.
cc/3P49-SAUE] (“Lonina told police she was trying to record the assault as evidence . . . .”); 
McPhate, supra note 45 (“Ms. Lonina told the police that she filmed the encounter to gather evidence 
of a crime.”); CPD Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165 (Lonina claimed that she pulled 
D.B.’s leg “to get her away from [Gates.]”); CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124 
(Lonina claimed that she wanted Gates to be aware that she was on Periscope to make him afraid to do 
anything “crazy” and that Lonina “wanted to try to help” D.B.). 
 200 Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125. 
 201 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (West 2020). 
 202 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 203 Id. 
204 The definition of rape in Ohio does not include a requirement that the offense occur in private. 
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A) (defining rape without distinguishing between public and 
private offenses). Rape can and does happen in public in the United States, as in the Genovese and 
Araujo cases. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1348–55; see also Allen, supra note 5, at 838, 863–64 
(describing the public rapes of a mentally disabled seventeen-year-old girl in New Jersey in 1989 and 
a fifteen-year-old girl in California in 2009); Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Masculinity & Title IX: Bullying 
and Sexual Harassment of Boys in the American Liberal State, 73 MD. L. REV. 887, 923–25 (2014) 
(discussing dynamics of public rapes); Per-Olof H. Wikström, Preventing City-Center Street Crimes, 
19 CRIME & JUST. 429, 437–39, 456, 459–60 (1995) (same). Public rapes are notorious amid atrocity 
crimes. See, e.g., IRINA ASTASHKEVICH, GENDERED VIOLENCE: JEWISH WOMEN IN THE POGROMS OF 
1917 TO 1921, at 38–54 (2018) (discussing mass rape of Jewish women as public spectacle); Valerie 
Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 7, 10–11 (2012) (noting that both the Revolutionary United Front and the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council committed rape in public during Sierra Leone’s armed conflict); 
Susana SàCouto, Advances and Missed Opportunities in the International Prosecution of Gender-
Based Crimes, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 49, 52 (2006) (noting that Tutsi women were raped in public 
during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda). 
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ond, using this misconception as an excuse would be invalid because igno-
rance or mistake of law is generally not a defense.205 Third, her claim is im-
plausible given D.B.’s requests for help.206 Worst of all, it is possible that 
Gates, like some other criminals, was spurred to rape because of, not despite, 
his knowing that he had an audience of Lonina and her Periscope account 
viewers.207 
Four aspects of Lonina’s conduct are open to interpretation and bear on 
her motive.208 First, she chose to livestream the crime instead of or in addition 
to calling the police. A charitable explanation is that Lonina routinely 
livestreamed and simply did not break that habit when it came to a crime. In-
deed, Lonina claimed she typically broadcasted via Periscope “several hours” 
per day.209 Lonina stated that, on the day of the rape itself, she and D.B. were 
“on Periscope the whole day” before going to Gates’s home210 and “that she 
was Periscoping her and [D.B.’s] travels to [the] residence,” where Lonina 
then requested and received Gates’s consent to Periscope their interaction.211 
As Gates was focusing his attention on D.B., Lonina explained that she “was on 
Periscope because [she] was bored.”212 Gates’s awareness that his actions were 
being recorded could support an inference that Lonina was attempting to deter 
him, which both Close (the case’s lead detective) and Rausch (the assistant pros-
ecutor) doubt.213 By Lonina’s own admission, her supposedly benign or even 
benevolent motive to livestream the rape was soon overcome by more self-
serving interests. According to Close, on the day of her arrest, Lonina told him: 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that ignorance of the law 
or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal sys-
tem.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (AM. L. INST. 2019) (“Neither knowledge nor recklessness or 
negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application 
of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition 
of the offense or the Code so provides.”); JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 210–26 (8th ed. 2019) (discussing mistake or ignorance of law); Mis-
take of Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 102 (“A mistake about the legal effect of a 
known fact or situation.”); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 127 (1997) (“It’s axiomatic that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse.’”); Kit 
Kinports, Heien’s Mistake of Law, 68 ALA. L. REV. 121, 134 (2016) (“[T]he courts in this country 
rarely allow criminal defendants to argue they made a mistake in interpreting the criminal statute they 
allegedly violated.”). 
 206 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. 
 208 See infra notes 209–237 and accompanying text. 
 209 Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125. 
 210 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 211 CPD-Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165. 
 212 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 213 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
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[T]hat she believed that by Periscoping the incident, it would ensure 
that [Gates] did not do something that he wasn’t supposed to do. 
However, after Ms. Lonina saw how many people were watching 
the live-streaming Periscope and how many comments and [how 
much] attention she was getting from the viewers, she got caught up 
in the excitement and did not stop videoing the incident.214 
 Indeed, Lonina acknowledged to Close during the interrogation that she 
was “having fun” and “making fun,” and that she did “enjoy” the positive 
feedback so much that it was “really hard to stop” filming.215 Close’s and 
Rausch’s own observations of a recording of the livestream bolsters that inter-
pretation. While interrogating Lonina, Close stated about the video: “it defi-
nitely looked like you were having fun filming it. It didn’t look like you were 
worried about [D.B.] or trying to get her away.”216 Close later added that 
Lonina “was really enjoying the attention” and that she was “an extreme atten-
tion seeker.”217 Rausch says that her impression of Lonina while livestreaming 
the rape was “that she enjoyed what she was doing,” she “wanted people to 
like her,” she sought “attention,” and she was not “interested in helping her 
friend.”218 Similarly, the Reporter believes that Lonina livestreamed the rape 
because “she always wanted to be famous, she loved the attention.”219 O’Brien 
conceded that Lonina may have originally intended to be helpful but, echoing 
Close’s summary of his interrogation of Lonina,220 said that “[s]he got caught 
up in the likes,”221 referring to her audience on Periscope giving “hearts”222 
and other positive feedback through comments in “chat.”223 Lonina may thus 
                                                                                                                           
 214 CPD-Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165; see also Author-Close Interview, supra 
note 126 (“[I]n the interview with Ms. Lonina, her comment, that because of how many comments 
and attention she was getting from the viewers that she got caught up in the excitement of it.”). 
 215 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124 (also quoting Lonina responding, “[y]eah 
seriously” to Close’s assertion that she “got caught up in” the audience’s positive feedback of “likes,” 
“hearts,” and “jokes”). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 218 Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 219 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 220 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124; see also supra note 214 and accompany-
ing text. 
 221 McPhate, supra note 45 (“Mr. O’Brien . . . said Ms. Lonina had apparently hoped that live-
streaming the attack would help to stop it, but that she became enthralled by positive feedback 
online.”); Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 222 How to Use Hearts and Chat on Periscope, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/hearts-and-chats [https://perma.cc/Y9A4-3LQ3] (“Hearts are a way for you to share your sup-
port and enthusiasm with a broadcaster and fellow viewers. If you like what you’re seeing, you can 
tap the screen to give the broadcaster a heart on iOS or Android.”). 
 223 Id. (“Chat allows you to comment on live broadcasts. It’s an essential part of the Periscope 
experience because it’s a way for viewers and broadcasters to engage with one another.”). 
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have initially sought to help D.B. but then became distracted by her own ego 
and vanity. At best, then, according to Lonina herself and others familiar with 
the case, she was ultimately not trying to aid D.B. by livestreaming—or at 
least continuing to livestream—the assault. 
A second aspect of Lonina’s conduct that compels further consideration is 
the moment that Lonina pulled on D.B.’s leg while D.B. screamed for help. 
Lonina claimed in a police interview that she tugged on D.B. “to get her away 
from [Gates].”224 According to O’Brien, however, Lonina’s motive in jerking 
D.B.’s body was unclear and may thus not have been so altruistic.225 The po-
lice and prosecution interpreted this act as evidence that Lonina sought to fa-
cilitate the rape by helping to hold D.B. down, spreading her legs, and, as she 
had done the previous night on camera, undressing her.226 Close added that, 
“[w]atching the video, there is no way that you would believe that [Lonina] 
was trying to get [D.B.] away from [Gates].”227 The Reporter concurs, empha-
sizing her observation about Lonina pouring vodka into D.B.’s mouth during 
Gates’s assault of her.228 
A third aspect of Lonina’s behavior that merits analysis is her laughing 
during the rape. During Close’s interrogation of Lonina, she also laughed more 
than ten inappropriate times.229 This conduct may suggest further that Lonina 
enjoyed watching and broadcasting the sexual assault. But Lonina’s intent in 
this context is again unclear. Was Lonina laughing because she found the situa-
tion genuinely humorous or for another reason—such as nervousness230 or to 
                                                                                                                           
 224 CPD-Lonina Interview – Summary, supra note 165. 
 225 McPhate, supra note 45 (paraphrasing O’Brien saying that, “[i]t was not clear . . . that 
[Lonina] intended to help the victim” when she pulled D.B.’s leg). 
 226 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-
Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 227 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 228 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 229 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 230 Rather than an expression of amusement, nervous laughter is often an involuntary physical 
reaction to anxiety, fear, stress, tension, confusion, awkwardness, or discomfort. See, e.g., Courtney v. 
Oklahoma, 722 F.3d 1216, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2013) (observing that laughter may be a sign of 
extreme nervousness); Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REV. 367, 389 
(1994) (describing nervous laughter as “cover[ing] up a deep apprehension”); Stanley Milgram, Be-
havioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 371, 375 (1963) (observing that a 
“sign of tension” can be “nervous laughter” and that laughter does not necessarily mean enjoyment); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1926 (2005) (describing nervous 
laughter as a “physical manifestation[] of deep distress”); Walter Probert, Courtroom Semantics, 5 
AM. JURIS. TRIALS 695, 696 (1966) (observing that “[a] nervous laugh is hardly intended”); Alex 
Lickerman, Why We Laugh, PSYCH. TODAY (Jan. 23, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/
blog/happiness-in-world/201101/why-we-laugh [https://perma.cc/X7B2-GBPD]. Sexual assault vic-
tims themselves sometimes display nervous laughter. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Medical Forensic 
Sexual Assault Examinations: What Are They, and What Can They Tell the Courts?, 54 JUDGES’ J. 16, 
19 (2015). 
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try to convince Gates that she was an accomplice when she was really trying to 
help her friend? Lonina described audience comments of “help her, help her” 
as “jokes,”231 suggesting that she interpreted the situation as comical. The Re-
porter, who viewed the livestream and knows Lonina well as her former best 
friend, believes, from her interpretation of Lonina’s laughing, smiling, and 
posing, that Lonina thought the whole situation was “funny” and that she was 
“enjoying it.”232 Similarly, Close, who watched a recording of the livestream, 
described his impression of it to Lonina as: “you were having fun—it’s obvi-
ous that you were having fun, laughing on it.”233 Close later added that it was 
clear that Lonina was laughing “out of amusement.”234 
A final aspect of Lonina’s actions that invites more exploration is that she 
repeatedly asked her livestream spectators: “What should I do now?”235 Sham-
ansky cited these questions as partial evidence that Lonina “does everything 
possible to contain the situation.”236 It is unclear, however, how Lonina’s mere 
solicitation of audience input actually helped to prevent or stop the rape, espe-
cially because she did not then do anything personally to aid D.B. Others in-
terpret these requests for instructions as a display of Lonina’s desire to appeal 
to her social media followers.237 
Commentators, including psychologists, have seized on these four fea-
tures of Lonina’s conduct as evidence of evil—or at least egocentric—intent.238 
Some of these analysts argue that Lonina’s overall conduct demonstrates that 
her psychological need for approval and excitement outweighed whatever care 
she may have felt for D.B.239 Other specialists go further, contending either 
that the attention Lonina was enjoying online completely divorced her from 
                                                                                                                           
 231 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 232 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 233 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 234 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 235 Holley, supra note 126 (quoting Shamansky describing Lonina’s behavior in the video). 
 236 Id. (quoting Shamansky). 
 237 Marche, supra note 143 (“[I]t is the ‘What should I do now? What should I do now?’ that is 
particularly jarring. It wasn’t just as a witness that Lonina acted; it was as a witness engaged with a 
live audience whom she wished to please.”). 
 238 See infra notes 239–240 and accompanying text. 
 239 The director of the Media Psychology Research Center, Pamela Rutledge, argued about the 
case: 
You don’t film on Periscope to document a sexual attack. . . . You call 911 and hit the 
guy over the head with a chair. The fact that [Lonina] became an accomplice implies 
that her psychological need for approval and the thrill of the event were greater than her 
concern or empathy for her friend during a serious sexual assault. 
Kazdin, supra note 107. Rutledge also suspects that Lonina may have derived a “perverse thrill” from 
watching D.B.’s victimization. Id. 
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reality or that she was actually deriving a “perverse thrill” from observing her 
then-best friend be assaulted.240 
Further investigation of the case supports these commentators’ view that 
Lonina never intended to act altruistically when livestreaming the rape. The 
Reporter states that Lonina is a “psychopath” with a history of abusing and 
seeking to humiliate others, including the Reporter herself.241 According to the 
Reporter, who says she was Lonina’s best friend before D.B. was,242 Lonina 
created fake social media accounts where she posted “bad” pictures of her 
friends, and she spread rumors about and played cruel pranks on her friends 
(including the Reporter), such as spiking their drinks with laxatives.243 Rausch 
concurs that “there was something off” with Lonina, “something a little bit 
missing, in terms of her emotional response to the situation.”244 Likewise, 
Close felt from his interactions with Lonina that she was “cold” and had “no 
remorse.”245 
Lonina also had recently mistreated D.B. Just the previous night, rather 
than help D.B. or leave her alone while she was ill from drinking, Lonina not 
only livestreamed her friend while she was visibly sick but also disrobed her in 
the process, making the scene even more salacious for her Periscope audi-
ence.246 
Because Lonina pleaded guilty, it is impossible to know how a jury would 
have interpreted her motive and mens rea or whether—and, if so, on which of 
the nine charges—it would have convicted her.247 Still, multiple factors suggest 
that Lonina’s motive was not noble, that her actus reus and mens rea were 
criminal, and that she was therefore an Enabler Transmitter rather than a By-
stander or Upstander Transmitter. Those factors include: (1) Lonina’s pattern 
of cruelty and humiliation towards her friends, including her former (the Re-
porter) and current (D.B.) best friends; (2) Lonina’s demeanor and behavior 
throughout the livestream; (3) Lonina’s and Shamansky’s acknowledgments 
about her motivations amid the broadcast; (4) Lonina’s admission that she did 
nothing to try to stop the rape; (5) Lonina’s implausible explanation of why she 
did not know that what she was witnessing was a crime; and (6) Lonina’s deci-
                                                                                                                           
 240 The executive director of the New York Center for Neuropsychology and Forensic Behavioral 
Science, N.G. Berrill, stated about Lonina: “She was enjoying the attention she was getting by pre-
senting this for public consumption. The reality of what was going on was seemingly lost on her en-
tirely—it’s scary.” Id. 
 241 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; Reporter E-mail to Pietanza, supra note 141. 
 242 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 243 Reporter E-mail to Pietanza, supra note 141. 
 244 Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 245 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 246 See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. 
 247 Entry of Guilty Plea, supra note 168 (listing the nine charges for which Lonina was indicted). 
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sion not to proactively contact the police during or even after the offense. 
Summarizing Lonina’s role in the rape, O’Brien referred to her as Gates’s “ac-
complice” rather than a mere bystander.248 In particular, Lonina’s pull on the 
victim’s leg and admission that she got “caught up in” the positive feedback 
were significant for prosecutors, as these factors indicated that Lonina “went 
over the edge” from being a witness to a co-conspirator.249 
c. Bad Samaritan Law Liability 
Lonina could have been charged with violating Ohio’s general Bad Sa-
maritan law if sufficient evidence showed that she knew about the rape and 
that she knowingly declined to notify law enforcement authorities while the 
crime was in progress or sometime later.250 Lonina could not have been 
charged with violating Ohio’s specific Bad Samaritan law because—although 
Lonina knew or should have reasonably suspected Gates’s abuse of D.B. (who 
was then under eighteen years of age)—Lonina, as an eighteen-year-old high 
school student, did not hold any of the particular professional positions re-
quired to comply.251 
Although prosecutors charged Lonina with nine crimes, they did not 
charge her with violating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law because they 
viewed that as unnecessary and undesirable.252 Investigators and prosecutors in 
the Gates-Lonina case, who already seldom enforced Ohio’s general Bad Sa-
maritan law,253 prioritized their limited resources and time on addressing the 
underlying crimes: Gates’s rape of D.B. and the facilitating and exacerbating 
role Lonina played in broadcasting that offense.254 Lonina was not charged 
with violating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law (a low-level misdemeanor255) 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (West 2020) (stating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan 
law for reporting felonies). 
 251 See id. § 2151.421(A)(1)(a) (requiring an official who “knows, or has reasonable cause to 
suspect based on facts that would cause a reasonable person in a similar position to suspect, that a 
child under eighteen years of age . . . has suffered or faces a threat of suffering any physical or mental 
wound, injury, disability, or condition” to report that knowledge or reasonable suspicion to specified 
authorities). 
 252 See infra notes 253–258 and accompanying text. 
 253 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126 (stating that he has never “used” that law and is not 
aware of anyone else who has); Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76 (stating that Ohio’s general 
Bad Samaritan law is “rarely used”); Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76 (explaining that Ohio’s 
general Bad Samaritan law “just wasn’t a charge we used very often”). 
 254 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 255 Violation of Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(I), the second-lowest degree of misdemeanors in Ohio. Such a violation 
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because she was already charged with multiple other offenses—all of which, as 
felonies, were more serious and carried more severe punishment—and investi-
gators and prosecutors were reasonably confident that she would be convicted 
of at least one of those felonies.256 Furthermore, charging Lonina with a mis-
demeanor in addition to the felonies would have introduced potential legal and 
logistical challenges. In Ohio’s Franklin County, where the Gates-Lonina case 
was prosecuted, misdemeanors are addressed at the city level while felonies 
are addressed at the county level.257 Typically, prosecutors charging felonies in 
that county would not also charge misdemeanors for the same criminal context 
because doing so would lead to two separate cases in which the same witnesses 
could be called, which can cause problems if they provide inconsistent testi-
mony.258 
But there could have been a further reason not to charge Lonina with vio-
lating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law: to avoid infringing her right against 
self-incrimination, protected under both the Ohio259 and U.S.260 constitutions. 
The importance of exempting potential self-incriminators from duty-to-report 
laws and drafting or amending Bad Samaritan laws to avoid self-
incrimination—as I have proposed elsewhere261—is underscored by U.S. juris-
prudence on these statutes (including in Ohio itself) as well as a foreign inci-
dent that is eerily similar to the Gates-Lonina case. 
                                                                                                                           
can result in a jail term of not more than thirty days, id. § 2929.24(A)(4), and/or a fine of not more 
than $250, id. § 2929.28(A)(2)(a)(iv). 
 256 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 257 Prosecution Resources Unit—Intake Section, Mediation, Check Resolution Programs, CITY OF 
COLUMBUS, https://city-attorney.columbus.gov/prosecution-pru.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NDV-2ZA2] 
(“The Intake Section serves the citizens of Franklin County and the City of Columbus by processing 
criminal misdemeanor complaints. . . . Felony matters are investigated by the police and prosecuted by 
the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office.”); FRANKLIN CNTY., OHIO CT. OF COMMON PLEAS: GEN. 
DIV., https://www.fccourts.org [https://perma.cc/27RR-4KPK] (“The Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas - General Division has original jurisdictional authority over all felony cases and all 
civil cases in which the sum or matter in dispute exceeds $15,000.”); Author-Close Interview, supra 
note 126; Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 258 Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (vacating convictions for murder and 
robbery because the prosecution presented conflicting testimony from same witness in separate trials); 
Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. In 2000, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Smith v. Groose that due process “prohibits prosecu-
tors from putting forth inherently factually contradictory theories to convict multiple defendants of the 
same murder.” 205 F.3d at 1054. 
 259 OHIO CONST. art. I § 10 (“No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”). 
 260 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”). 
 261 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1339, 1376–78, 1384–86. As defined in that article, “Self-
Incriminators” are reporters who “[w]ould unconstitutionally incriminate [them]selves in a crime if 
[they] intervened.” Id. at 1376 tbl.2. 
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In 1985, in State v. Wardlow, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction of a defendant for violating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law because, 
the court ruled, the statute infringed upon the defendant’s right against self-
incrimination.262 The defendant had not reported that her live-in boyfriend 
sexually assaulted her daughter.263 The court reasoned that compliance with the 
Bad Samaritan law would likely have led to the defendant’s prosecution for 
welfare fraud (because, as a welfare recipient, the defendant was required to 
disclose a partner residing with her, which she had not) and child endanger-
ment.264 
Similarly, thirty-two years later, the Swedish Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction for a Bad Samaritan law violation after the defendant livestreamed 
a gang rape in Sweden via Facebook.265 In that case, the defendant was initial-
ly convicted by Swedish district and appeals courts of aggravated defamation 
and failure to report an ongoing rape,266 the latter of which is criminalized un-
der both of Sweden’s Bad Samaritan laws.267 The Swedish Supreme Court, 
however, ruled that because the prosecutor had initially also charged the man 
with aiding the crime, in order to avoid requiring self-incrimination the prose-
                                                                                                                           
 262 State v. Wardlow, 484 N.E.2d 276, 277–79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (“[A]ppellant’s 
privilege against self-incrimination was unconstitutionally infringed under the facts of this case sub 
judice.”). 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 279. 
 265 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 266 Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Supreme Court Rules Live Broadcast of Rape Is Aggravated 




 267 BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [Penal Code] 6:15 (Swed.) (criminalizing “failure to disclose or pre-
vent, rape, gross rape, rape of a child, gross rape of a child, gross exploitation of a child for sexual 
posing and gross procuring”). The Swedish Penal Code also criminalizes failure to report that is not 
limited to rape and related offenses: 
A person who fails to report or otherwise disclose in time an offence that is imminent or 
in progress is, in cases specifically provided for, guilty of failure to disclose the offence 
and is sentenced according to the provision for a person who was only an accomplice to 
such an offense to a minor extent. . . . In cases specifically provided for, a person who 
did not have intent but ought to have realised that the offence was imminent or in pro-
gress is also guilty of failure to disclose an offence. 
Id. at 23:6; see also ‘Facebook Rape Video’ Trio Sentenced to Prison, LOCAL SE (Swed.) (Apr. 25, 
2017), https://www.thelocal.se/20170425/facebook-rape-video-trio-sentenced-to-prison [https://
perma.cc/8Y73-H9AF] (stating that the man who filmed the rape was found guilty of failing to report 
rape and gross defamation). 
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cutor could not also have charged him with failing to report that offense.268 
The Gates-Lonina case is similar to Wardlow and the Swedish case because, if 
Lonina had been charged with failing to report the crime in which she was ac-
cused of being involved, then a court may have ruled that these simultaneous 
charges would unconstitutionally violate her privilege against self-
incrimination.269 
Additionally, the prosecutor’s charging decisions in the Gates-Lonina 
case reflect prosecutorial discretion more generally. Usually, prosecutors focus 
on investigating and charging the observed crime rather than the failure to re-
port it or intervene.270 Moreover, even when prosecutors charge third parties, it 
is typically for accomplice liability and other alternate crimes.271 However, in 
addition to offenses of commission, such as acting as an accomplice, third par-
ties may also engage in acts of omission in which they fail to discharge a duty 
to rescue or to report the crime.272 Had Lonina been a passive bystander rather 
than actively engage in ways that led prosecutors to charge her with multiple 
felonies, then a violation of Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law might have 
been the only charge they could bring against her. 
What if, as part of her passivity, Lonina had wanted to call the police but 
was genuinely afraid to do so? Whether she would be excused from a Bad Sa-
maritan law could depend on (1) what, exactly, she feared; (2) whether that 
fear was reasonable; and (3) whether the relevant Bad Samaritan law recog-
nized such a reasonable fear as an exception to compliance. If, like the Report-
er,273 Lonina had been afraid to contact the police out of intimidation and lack 
of familiarity with law enforcement, then that fear—reasonable or otherwise—
would not excuse her under any Bad Samaritan law in the United States be-
cause none of these statutes excuses a bystander for fear of the police.274 If, 
however, Lonina had been frightened of Gates because she thought he might 
physically injure her if she contacted the police, then that fear, if reasonable, 
                                                                                                                           
 268 Högsta Domstolen [HD] [Supreme Court] July 2, 2018 Ö 3552–17 (Swed.), https://www.
domstol.se/hogsta-domstolen/avgoranden/2018/35038/ [https://perma.cc/75N4-G8WX]; Hofverberg, 
supra note 266. 
 269 See Högsta Domstolen [HD] [Supreme Court] July 2, 2018 Ö 3552–17 (Swed.); 484 N.E.2d at 
277–79. 
 270 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1347–48. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id.; see Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (2007) (discussing accomplice liability and the general rule that “one 
must ‘aid and abet’ another’s commission of a crime in order to be guilty”). 
 273 See infra notes 340, 358–359 and accompanying text. 
 274 See Appendix, supra note 17 (compiling Bad Samaritan laws in the United States, none of 
which lists fear of the police as an excuse for non-compliance). 
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would be an excuse under many Bad Samaritan laws outside of Ohio.275 Alt-
hough Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law lists six exemptions,276 fear—
reasonable or otherwise—is not one of them.277 So, even if Lonina were scared 
of Gates, that would not necessarily have been a legitimate defense had Lonina 
been charged with violating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law. Broadcasting a 
rape but not calling the police could thus theoretically be done out of goodwill 
but still not excuse the Transmitter from violating a Bad Samaritan law. 
B. Receivers 
This Section describes Receivers generally and then analyzes Receivers 
in the Gates-Lonina case overall, as well as five particular subsets of these Re-
ceivers.278 Although there were compelling legal and logistical reasons not to 
charge Lonina with violating a Bad Samaritan law, analysis of Receivers in the 
case suggests that some of them were better candidates for such charges, par-
ticularly if these statutes encompassed off-site spectators. 
                                                                                                                           
 275 See id. (compiling Bad Samaritan laws in the United States, some of which list fear of physical 
injury as an excuse for non-compliance). For example, both of Alaska’s Bad Samaritan laws—which 
divide duties to report violent crimes into separate statutes applying to victims who are children and 
adults—include fear of physical injury as an affirmative defense. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.765(b)(1) 
(2020) (“[I]t is an affirmative defense that the defendant did not report in a timely manner because the 
defendant reasonably believed that doing so would have exposed the defendant or others to a substan-
tial risk of physical injury.”); Id. § 11.56.767(b)(1)(A) (“[I]t is an affirmative defense that the defend-
ant did not report as soon as reasonably practicable because the defendant reasonably believed that 
doing so would have exposed the defendant or others to a substantial risk of physical injury.”). 
 276 Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law’s six exemptions include the following: 
(1) The information is privileged by reason of the relationship between attorney and cli-
ent; physician and patient, . . . husband and wife . . . . 
(2) The information would tend to incriminate a member of the actor’s immediate family. 
(3) Disclosure of the information would amount to revealing a news source . . . . 
(4) Disclosure of the information would amount to disclosure by a member of [an] or-
dained clergy . . . by a person seeking [their] aid or counsel . . . . 
(5) Disclosure would amount to revealing information acquired by the actor in the course 
of the actor’s duties in connection with a bona fide program of treatment or services for 
drug dependent persons or persons in danger of drug dependence . . . . 
(6) Disclosure would amount to revealing information acquired by the actor in the course 
of the actor’s duties in connection with a bona fide program for providing counseling 
services to victims of [certain] crimes . . . or to victims of felonious sexual penetration 
. . . . 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(G) (West 2020). 
 277 See id. 
 278 See infra notes 279–398 and accompanying text. 
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1. Receivers Generally 
Receivers are remote witnesses who see, hear, or otherwise observe live 
or recorded material from Transmitters. In contrast to Transmitters, who are 
physically present at the scene, Receivers are virtually present at the scene. 
When confronting a crime from afar, Receivers could engage in various ac-
tions or omissions, including: (1) passively observing; (2) actively engaging by 
providing feedback (positive, negative, or both) to the Transmitter or perpetra-
tor through mechanisms the platform permits, such as comments, emojis, or 
emoticons; (3) further broadcasting the Transmitter’s material; (4) reporting 
the situation to the platform or authorities; or (5) engaging in vigilantism, such 
as doxing the Transmitter or perpetrator. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, this Article’s typology divides Receivers across 
four dimensions (conduct, interaction with Transmitters, timing, and contextual 
knowledge), each of which is further divided into subtypes. This categorization 
is crucial for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that there are multiple 
kinds of Receivers. Second, it shows that that Receivers’ distinctions warrant 
different treatment under Bad Samaritan laws, as recommended in Part IV, 
Section A.279 Third, this framework indicates that those variations necessitate a 
modernized Bad Samaritan law, as proposed in Part IV, Section D.280 
This Article’s typology proposes three subtypes of Receivers based on 
their conduct. “Upstander Receivers” may intervene helpfully, for example, by 
attempting to assist the person in distress directly or notifying authorities. “En-
abler Receivers” may intervene harmfully, for instance, by facilitating or exac-
erbating a depicted crime. “Bystander Receivers” do not intervene at all. 
Likewise, this typology presents two subtypes of Receivers based on their in-
teraction with Transmitters. “Active Receivers” provide feedback—positive, 
negative, or both—to Transmitters. In contrast, “Passive Receivers” do not 
provide feedback.281 
Additionally, the timing and contextual knowledge dimensions each fea-
ture two subtypes. For timing, Receivers are either “Contemporaneous Receiv-
ers,” if they observe evidence of a crime as it is occurring, or “Delayed Re-
ceivers,” if they observe this evidence later. For contextual knowledge, “Famil-
iar Receivers” possess such information about the situation, whereas “Unfa-
miliar Receivers” do not. Like the Transmitter subtypes, Receiver subtypes are 
                                                                                                                           
 279 See infra notes 400–451 and accompanying text. 
 280 See infra notes 477–479 and accompanying text. 
 281 Another legal scholar distinguishes between “pure bystanders” and “engaged spectators,” 
which correspond to this Article’s “Passive Receivers” and “Active Receivers,” respectively. Uelmen, 
supra note 8, at 92. Uelmen differentiates these labels based on the person’s level of engagement: a 
pure bystander “pass[es] by or disengage[s]” whereas an engaged spectator “lock[s] their attention on 
the scene.” Id. 
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mutually exclusive within dimensions. For example, a Receiver cannot be both 
Active and Passive. Also like with Transmitter subtypes, Receiver subtypes 
across dimensions are not mutually exclusive. For example, a Receiver could 
simultaneously be a Bystander, Passive, Contemporaneous, and Familiar. 
FIGURE 2. Typology of Digital Age Samaritans: Receivers 
 
Although Transmitters are clearly subject to existing Bad Samaritan laws 
because they are physically present at the scene of the crime, the applicability 
of these statutes to Receivers is ambiguous.282 Receivers could thus argue that 
a Bad Samaritan law is inapplicable because they were not physically present 
at the scene. Where the statute explicitly or implicitly requires physical pres-
ence as an element of a violation, then Receivers could claim that their omis-
sion did not satisfy that aspect of the law. This gap in existing Bad Samaritan 
laws indicates why a modernized version, including explicit applicability to 
witnesses who are virtually present, is necessary if the statutes are to unambig-
uously apply to Receivers. 
Even if Bad Samaritan laws applied to Receivers, these remote witnesses 
could assert various defenses. First, certain Receivers could argue that even a 
Bad Samaritan law that encompasses virtual presence is inapplicable to them 
because they were neither physically nor virtually present at the scene. If a De-
layed Receiver is so delayed in observing evidence of a crime that the offense 
is no longer in progress, then they are not present, even virtually. 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
1162 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1117 
Second, Receivers could assert that, while their social media account or 
mobile device may have been used to view the proscribed material, they them-
selves were not the viewer.283 Charging Receivers with violating Bad Samari-
tan laws would pose evidentiary challenges because multiple people could 
have access to their digital devices.284 
Third, in particular contexts, Receivers could contend that a Bad Samari-
tan law is substantively inapplicable because of its subject matter. For exam-
ple, where Bad Samaritan laws apply only if the victim is under a certain age 
(as some do, but not in Ohio 285), then a Receiver could justify non-
intervention on the basis that the victim’s age exceeded the statutory threshold. 
As D.B. was seventeen at the time of the crime,286 a Receiver subject to a Bad 
Samaritan law with a younger victim age restriction—such as in California and 
Nevada287—could have asserted D.B.’s age as a defense. 
Finally, Receivers could claim a mistake of fact defense288 in attempting 
to negate the applicable Bad Samaritan law’s required mens rea. Consider 
again Bad Samaritan laws that apply only if the victim is under a certain 
age.289 Receivers could assert that they incorrectly but reasonably thought that 
the victim was older. Alternatively, Receivers could claim that they did not 
comprehend that what they were observing was real.290 By asserting this igno-
rance, the Receiver could argue that they did not know that the situation quali-
fied as any crime under the purview of a relevant Bad Samaritan law. Berrill, 
the forensic psychologist who commented on the Gates-Lonina case, argues 
that it is impossible to know whether a scene depicted via social media is 
                                                                                                                           
 283 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 284 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 285 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(a) (West 2021) (applying to victims “under 14 years of 
age”), and NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.882.1 (2020) (applying to victims “12 years of age or younger”), 
with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2020) (including no specific age restrictions on its Bad 
Samaritan law). Per a federal Bad Samaritan law, victims must be children. Protecting Young Victims 
from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–126, § 101, 132 Stat. 
318 (2018). For discussion of Bad Samaritan laws’ victim age restrictions, see Kaufman, supra note 3, 
at 1388–89 (arguing that duty-to-report laws’ victim age restrictions should be eliminated); Kaufman, 
No Cover for Abusers, supra note 13 (same); Kaufman, Speaking Up, supra note 13 (same). 
 286 CPD-Victim Interview, supra note 129. 
 287 See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 288 A mistake of fact defense is “[a] criminal defendant’s claim that some factual error negates the 
mens rea necessary for a guilty verdict.” Mistake of Fact Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 102. 
 289 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(a) (requiring reporting to a “peace officer” of any rape, 
murder, or other specified crime against a child fourteen years old or younger); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 202.882.1(a) (requiring reporting of any “violent or sexual offense” against a child who is twelve 
years old or younger). 
 290 Receivers could assert this defense regardless of their location, how accessible their social 
media account or mobile device is to other people, or the subject matter depicted in the broadcast. 
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staged.291 But he is wrong. Receivers can sometimes determine if what they 
observe is—or is likely to be—real. Familiar Receivers may be able to surmise 
authenticity if they are sufficiently acquainted with one or more of the people 
involved or possess other knowledge about the situation. 
2. Receivers in the Gates-Lonina Case Generally 
In the Gates-Lonina case, because D.B. was a minor, any Receiver (in-
cluding the specific Receivers described below) of either livestream—the Feb-
ruary 26 broadcast of D.B. naked or the transmission of her rape the following 
day—arguably violated either or both of Ohio’s Bad Samaritan laws.292 If a 
Receiver were in Ohio and did not report the rape, then they may have violated 
Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law.293 If a Receiver were in Ohio, held the re-
quired positions, were acting in an official or professional capacity,294 and did 
not report the rape, then they may have violated Ohio’s specific Bad Samaritan 
law.295 If a Receiver were anywhere in the United States other than Ohio and 
did not report the rape, then they may have violated either the Bad Samaritan 
law in their jurisdiction or one or both of Ohio’s Bad Samaritan laws if those 
statutes applied extraterritorially.296 
Several types of Receivers viewed Lonina’s Periscope broadcast. First, 
according to the Reporter, “a lot of” these spectators were former classmates 
with Lonina at their New York high school and knew at least Lonina’s name 
and the city from which she was transmitting.297 These observers would quali-
fy as Familiar Receivers because they possessed contextual knowledge about 
the broadcast. Additionally, more than 700 Receivers watched the livestream 
via Periscope as the rape was occurring, making them Contemporaneous Re-
ceivers. Those who watched a recording of the video later via Periscope or an-
other social media site, of which there is an unknown number, are Delayed 
Receivers. 
At the time of Gates and Lonina’s arrest, a commentator predicted that 
“the vast majority of the people watching” would not be prosecuted.298 In fact, 
not a single Receiver was; no investigator or prosecutor even sought to deter-
                                                                                                                           
 291 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 292 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (West 2020) (stating Ohio’s general Bad Sa-
maritan law), with id. § 2151.421(A)(1)(a) (stating Ohio’s specific Bad Samaritan law). 
 293 See id. § 2921.22(A). 
 294 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 295 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(A)(1)(a). 
 296 See id. § 2151.421(A)(1)(a); id. § 2921.22(A); see also Appendix, supra note 17 (compiling 
Bad Samaritan laws among other U.S. states). 
 297 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 298 Kazdin, supra note 107. 
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mine who any of the Receivers were or whether they were in Ohio and thus 
unquestionably subject to the state’s Bad Samaritan laws.299 O’Brien explained 
that one of the reasons Lonina herself was not charged with violating Ohio’s 
general Bad Samaritan law is also one of the reasons that no officials pursued 
Bad Samaritan law charges against Receivers: a different office handles mis-
demeanors and that other office was not involved in this case.300 Close and 
Rausch noted that another reason Lonina herself was not charged with this of-
fense—because investigators and prosecutors prioritized addressing the under-
lying crime of rape—also contributed to their decision not to pursue accounta-
bility for any of the Receivers.301 Finally, Close adds that, because violations 
of Ohio’s Bad Samaritan laws are such low-level offenses, the resources that 
would have been required to unmask the spectators would have exceeded the 
value in enforcing the laws.302 
Had charges been brought against Receivers, they likely could not have 
asserted a successful mistake of fact defense based on a claim that they did not 
comprehend that they were observing an actual sexual assault. According to 
O’Brien, anyone watching “would conclude” that the situation was a rape, add-
ing that it was clear “this young lady was under the influence and/or taken ad-
vantage of by” Gates.303 Similarly, Close states “that the average person” 
watching the video would “know that what was going on was not right” and 
that it would be “beyond a reasonable doubt” to any viewer that Gates’s con-
duct was criminal.304 Thus, a Receiver’s claim that they did not know they 
were witnessing a rape would strain credulity.305 
While no Receivers in the Gates-Lonina case were prosecuted, imple-
menting the recommendations in Part IV could promote justice and accounta-
bility in similar situations in the future.306 One of those recommendations—to 
institute a hierarchy of liability among Receivers—is informed by analyzing 
Receivers’ distinctions in the Gates-Lonina case. 
                                                                                                                           
 299 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-
Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 300 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 301 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 302 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. Specifically, the charges for violating Ohio’s general 
Bad Samaritan law are misdemeanors. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(I) (West 2020) (“Violation 
of [the general Bad Samaritan law] is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.”). In contrast, violation of 
Ohio’s rape statute is a “felony of the first degree.” Id. § 2907.02(B). 
 303 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 304 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 305 See id. 
 306 See infra notes 399–479 and accompanying text. 
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3. Specific Receivers in the Gates-Lonina Case 
This subsection analyzes five groupings of specific Receivers in the Gates-
Lonina case. Only one Receiver—the Reporter—acted as an upstander who 
alerted authorities. Hundreds of others were aware of the crime and chose to be 
bystanders or enablers. At least one of these individuals—Lonina’s father—
could have been charged with violating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law.307 
a. The Reproducer(s) 
One of many troubling aspects of the Gates-Lonina case was that a person 
or group of people (the “Reproducer(s)”) copied and disseminated the Peri-
scope rape video.308 Copies of the February 27 livestream were uploaded to at 
least two social media sites: YouTube and VK.309 At least one person, but pos-
sibly multiple people, then republished these videos.310 Because, at the time, 
Periscope automatically deleted videos after twenty-four hours,311 whoever 
posted those copies likely used a phone to record the livestream playing on 
another phone or computer and then uploaded the recording to the internet.312 
The Reporter told police that her unnamed friend (not Lonina) video recorded 
the February 27 livestream as it was occurring and then posted that copy to 
YouTube,313 but the Reporter said that she did not know who posted the copy 
to VK.314 The Reporter subsequently claimed that she does not personally 
know any of the Reproducer(s) but that they were in Russia.315 If Lonina was 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A). 
 308 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129 (acknowledging that someone uploaded a video 
of the rape to YouTube). The Reporter claims that she did not know the person who uploaded it, con-
tending that they were from another country. Id. 
 309 Id. VK is a Russian social media company based in Russia. See VK, http://vk.com/ [https://
perma.cc/HWU7-NZQ5]. VK is sometimes called the “Russian Facebook.” See, e.g., Samantha 
Chang, “Russian Facebook” VK Wants to Turn Its 100 Million Users into Crypto Fans, CCN (Mar. 
31, 2019), https://www.ccn.com/russian-facebook-vk-wants-to-turn-its-100-million-users-into-crypto-
fans/ [https://perma.cc/ZK32-5RKH]. 
 310 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 311 In May 2016—three months after Lonina’s livestream on February 27 of that year—Periscope 
announced that broadcasts could be posted for longer than 24 hours. Mariella Moon, Periscope #Saves 
Your Broadcasts Beyond 24 Hours, ENGADGET (May 5, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016-05-
05-periscope-save-feature.html [https://perma.cc/HM3V-6W4Z]. Since then, Periscope has provided 
users with the option of posting broadcasts indefinitely. How to Save a Periscope Broadcast, TWIT-
TER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/save-broadcast [https://perma.cc/Y5AE-BBLS] (provid-
ing instructions for users to save their broadcasts to their devices). 
 312 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 313 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
 314 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 315 Id. Whether these Reproducer(s) could or should be subject to Russia’s own Bad Samaritan 
law is outside the scope of this Article. For Russia’s Bad Samaritan law, see UGOLOVNYI KODEKS 
ROSSIĬSKOI ̆ FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 125 (Russ.) (“The deliberate abandoning with-
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not the person who copied the livestream to VK, then none of the Reproduc-
er(s) would qualify as Transmitters since they were not physically present at 
the scene of the crime. While at least the Reporter’s friend who posted the vid-
eo to YouTube was a Contemporaneous Receiver, it is possible that the per-
son(s) who uploaded the broadcast to VK (and any other social media sites) 
were Delayed Receivers. 
The Reproducer(s) in the Gates-Lonina case all qualify as Enabler Re-
ceivers because they compounded the crime by spreading the recording to 
more platforms. As Periscope automatically deleted videos within twenty-four 
hours at the time of the crime, the rape recording only survived because these 
individuals deliberately copied and posted it elsewhere. Indeed, the Reporter 
claims that copies of the recording can still be found on the internet today.316 
As further distribution of child pornography revictimizes the child,317 D.B. 
continues to suffer from the actions of the Reproducer(s).318 
Like other Receivers in the Gates-Lonina case, anyone who copied and 
posted the February 27 livestream could be charged with violating any relevant 
Bad Samaritan laws.319 These acts of reproducing and sharing alone, however, 
may not be sufficient for a conviction. Like other Receivers, the Reproducer(s) 
could assert various defenses, such as mistake of fact or not possessing the 
requisite mens rea.320 The Reproducer(s) could also contend that they were 
genuinely trying to help by preserving evidence of and publicizing the crime. 
Thus, the Reproducer(s) could argue that, even though they did not directly con-
tact law enforcement, they were indeed attempting to alert and assist authorities. 
                                                                                                                           
out aid of person who is in a state of danger to human life or health, and who is deprived of the possi-
bility of taking measures towards self-preservation . . . in cases where the convicted person had the 
possibility to render aid to this person and was obliged to take care of him, or who has put him in the 
state of danger to life and health, shall be punishable by a fine . . . or by obligatory labour . . . or by 
compulsory labour . . . or by an arrest . . . or by deprivation of liberty . . . .”). 
 316 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 317 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“The distribution of photographs and 
films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children . . . . 
[because] the materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm 
to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”); Katherine M. Giblin, Note, Click, Download, Cau-
sation: A Call for Uniformity and Fairness in Awarding Restitution to Those Victimized by Possessors 
of Child Pornography, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2011) (“[A]s the Internet’s convenience 
facilitates the child-pornography market, it correspondingly fuels the perpetual victimization of the 
depicted children.”); Devon Ishii Peterson, Comment, Child Pornography on the Internet: The Effect 
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 on Tort Recovery for Victims Against 
Internet Service Providers, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 763, 771 (2002) (“Each time [child pornography] is 
republished, the child is re-victimized.”). 
 318 While the Reproducer(s) in this case exacerbated the crime, not all Reproducers would qualify 
as enablers. For example, activists who post videos of police brutality seek to raise awareness about 
the misconduct, not aggravate it. See supra notes 82–88. 
 319 See Appendix, supra note 17 (listing Bad Samaritan laws in the United States and abroad). 
 320 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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b. The Responders 
Rather than passively observing or, as the Reproducer(s) did, silently 
copying and posting the video, hundreds of people321 responded to Lonina as 
they watched her livestream of the rape. These “Responders” are Active Re-
ceivers because they provided feedback to the Transmitter. They are also Con-
temporaneous Receivers because they did so in real time. 
Hundreds322 of Responders offered positive feedback, such as giving 
“hearts” (a demonstration, according to Periscope itself, of “support and enthu-
siasm”323) and writing comments prodding Lonina to continue broadcasting the 
crime for their amusement and to remove the bed cover so that the audience 
could better view the assault, both of which Lonina did.324 These Responders 
qualify as Enabler Receivers because they directly and explicitly encouraged 
Lonina’s broadcast, validated her actions and omissions, and prompted her to 
improve the viewers’ vantage. Also, because Gates knew Lonina was 
livestreaming, these Receivers may have indirectly and implicitly encouraged 
him to continue his assault.325 
In contrast, other Responders presented negative feedback to Lonina by 
writing comments prodding her to help D.B. by contacting the police or a 
neighbor and expressing outrage about Gates’s conduct.326 These Responders 
qualify as Upstander Receivers because they attempted to assist a person in 
distress. 
O’Brien stated that the video features a “constant” flow of Receiver input 
and that it was “mixed” between positive and negative feedback.327 The Re-
porter concurs, noting that the comments and hearts were “nonstop” and that, 
by her estimate, 60% of comments were positive while 40% were negative and 
that viewers gave thousands of hearts.328 
Although giving hearts does not necessarily indicate that an Active Re-
ceiver understands the situation as genuine, certain comments—both positive 
and negative—could. For those Active Receivers who do demonstrate 
                                                                                                                           
 321 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129 (stating that “[a] lot of people were comment-
ing”); Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46 (stating that “hundreds” of people were comment-
ing). 
 322 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126 (stating that “hundreds” of people gave hearts); Au-
thor-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129 (stating that “[l]ots of people” gave hearts). 
 323 How to Use Hearts and Chat on Periscope, supra note 222. 
 324 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126 (noting that the comments Lonina received gave her 
“affirmation” for continuing to livestream the rape); Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 325 See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. 
 326 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 327 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 328 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. As a Periscope user can give unlimited hearts, the 
number of hearts can exceed the number of Active Receivers. Id. 
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knowledge of authenticity, it would be easier for prosecutors to prove their lia-
bility under any relevant Bad Samaritan laws as compared to Bystander Re-
ceivers who passively observe and thus do not convey comprehension.329 
Even though negative feedback, such as merely prodding Lonina to stop 
broadcasting or to help D.B., is less incriminating than positive feedback, hav-
ing provided negative feedback would not necessarily be a defense. Bad Sa-
maritan statutes often mandate alerting specific individuals. For example, 
Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law330 requires reporting to law enforcement 
authorities to avoid liability. Active, Contemporaneous Receivers who are Up-
stander Receivers would not have discharged that duty just by unsuccessfully 
prompting Lonina to aid D.B. Ironically, then, Active, Contemporaneous Re-
ceivers who are Upstander Receivers but do not report may be among the most 
susceptible of all Receivers to being convicted of violating any relevant duty 
to report because of the knowledge they demonstrate while the crime is being 
committed.331 If, however, Active, Contemporaneous Receivers who are Up-
stander Receivers had successfully persuaded Lonina to assist D.B. directly, 
then these individuals could argue that they discharged any relevant duty to 
rescue under an applicable Bad Samaritan law. 
c. The Reporter 
The Reporter watched Lonina’s livestreams on both February 26 and 
27332 and took screenshots of both broadcasts.333 She was thus a Contempora-
neous Receiver because she witnessed the events over the internet as they un-
folded. Of the hundreds of viewers of the February 27 livestream (including 
the Reproducer(s) and the Responders), the Reporter (who was living in 
Brooklyn, New York, at the time334) is the only person identified as reporting 
the crime they witnessed.335 Indeed, the Reporter told at least four people: 
D.B.’s mother, the Reporter’s high school counselor, and police officers where 
the Reporter was living (New York City) and where the crime was committed 
(Columbus, Ohio).336 Any one of these efforts—and certainly their aggrega-
tion—qualifies the Reporter as an Upstander Receiver. And her upstanderism 
                                                                                                                           
 329 For example, under Vermont’s Bad Samaritan law, the actor must “know[] that another is 
exposed to grave physical harm.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2021). Making certain comments 
about the crime being witnessed may satisfy this knowledge requirement. See id. 
 330 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 331 Active, Contemporaneous, Enabler Receivers who do not report could also be highly suscepti-
ble to being convicted of violating any relevant duty to report. 
 332 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
 333 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 334 CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
 335 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 336 Id. 
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was effective. O’Brien states that it would have been “unlikely that charges 
would have occurred but for the existence of video” the Reporter provided and 
that Gates would not have pleaded guilty.337 Close concurs, describing the Re-
porter’s role in the investigation as “extremely important.”338 
First, on either the night of the rape (February 27) or the following day, 
the Reporter told D.B.’s mother through Facebook by using a friend’s fake ac-
count to shield her identity.339 Through private messages, the Reporter de-
scribed the livestream and provided the screenshots of the February 27 
livestream.340 The Reporter explains that she notified D.B.’s mother about the 
rape because the Reporter thought that D.B.’s parents should know and also 
because the Reporter preferred that D.B.’s parents, rather than the Reporter 
herself, contact the police.341 
Second, three days after the February 27 livestream, the Reporter alerted 
her high school counselor about the incident.342 The Reporter explains that she 
contacted the counselor for four reasons: (1) D.B.’s mother had not replied to 
her; (2) the Reporter was afraid of the police; (3) the Reporter did not know 
how to contact the police directly; and (4) the Reporter assumed the counselor 
would do so on her behalf.343 
Third, after that counselor notified the New York Police Department 
(NYPD), law enforcement officers followed up with the Reporter.344 The Re-
porter provided the NYPD with the URL of the video copied to YouTube as 
well as screenshots of the video that Lonina livestreamed via Periscope.345 
Fourth, the NYPD contacted the Columbus Police Department (CPD) and 
shared the evidence that the Reporter had collected.346 Close, of the CPD, then 
interviewed the Reporter over the phone, during which she explained how she 
knew Lonina and D.B. and confirmed the evidence she had provided to the 
NYPD.347 
                                                                                                                           
 337 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 338 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 339 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46; CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
 343 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. Specifically, when D.B.’s mother did not re-
spond, the Reporter stated: “I realized I had to go and tell someone else.” Id. 
 344 CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
 345 CPD Investigation Progress 2016.04.05, supra note 160; Author-Close Interview, supra note 
126; CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
 346 CPD Summary 2016.04.05, supra note 125 (stating that NYPD Sergeant John Pietanza 
“[o]btained copies of photographs and video from YouTube and sent them to CPD”). 
 347 CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159. 
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The Reporter, who had maintained contact with Lonina through social 
media after Lonina moved from Brooklyn to Columbus,348 was in an unusu-
al—possibly even unique—position among all Receivers of the February 27 
livestream. As Lonina’s self-described former best friend, the Reporter knew 
Lonina’s history of cruelty to others, including the Reporter herself;349 
Lonina’s real name (not just her alias on Periscope350); and the city in which 
the crime was perpetrated.351 As the Reporter had watched the livestream from 
the previous night,352 she was also familiar with Lonina’s history of cruelty 
specifically towards D.B. And, as the Reporter regularly watched Lonina’s 
livestreams (in which D.B. often appeared) and as Lonina had remotely intro-
duced D.B. and the Reporter,353 the Reporter also knew D.B.’s real name and 
age and that D.B. (like the Reporter and Lonina) spoke Russian.354 Aggregat-
ing all of this data, the Reporter found D.B.’s mother’s Facebook account.355 
The Reporter was thus a Familiar Receiver and was well-situated to be able to 
provide authorities with helpful details not available in the video itself.356 
Because the Reporter was a Familiar Receiver, had she chosen not to re-
port, she might have been a leading candidate for being charged with and con-
victed of violating any relevant Bad Samaritan laws.357 Even if she had been so 
charged, though, she could have asserted either or both of two defenses. First, 
the Reporter claims that she—and her parents—feared Lonina’s father (Alexey 
Lonin358) might physically harm the Reporter if she interceded.359 Most Bad 
                                                                                                                           
 348 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Warrant to Search, Franklin Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (Apr. 6, 2016) (on file with author) 
(identifying Lonina’s alias as: “Gangster Sotnikova $ @marina_in_the_sky”); Preservation Request, 
Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police (Mar. 1, 2016) (on file with author) (same). 
 351 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 352 Id.; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 353 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 354 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 355 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 356 The Reporter later said that, given all of her contextual knowledge, notifying authorities was 
“the right thing to do.” Id. O’Brien theorizes that it was the Reporter’s troubling history with Lonina 
that was “a motivating factor” to alert the authorities. Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 357 See supra notes 278–291 and accompanying text. 
 358 Lonina’s father’s first and last names are spelled differently in various sources. Some sources 
refer to him as “Alexsey Logun.” See, e.g., Columbus, Ohio Div. of Police, Case Report Number 
163049068-001, Informational Summary #3: Interview of Witness (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter CPD-Victim’s Mother Interview]. Other sources refer to him as “Alexey Lonin.” 
See, e.g., Criminal Case Detail: Case Number 16 CR 001992, FRANKLIN CNTY. CLERK OF CTS. (Mar. 
3, 2016), https://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/caseSearch?1H3TaTnxXaD9D8
NnPlDm [https://perma.cc/JV6E-WJHM]. Given Russian naming conventions (that feminize family 
surnames by adding an “a”), it is more likely that “Lonin” is his last name given that his daughter’s 
last name is “Lonina.” E-mail from Samuel Charap, Senior Pol. Scientist, RAND, to the Author (June 
4, 2020, 10:25 AM) (on file with author). 
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Samaritan laws explicitly excuse individuals who reasonably believe that in-
tervening would physically imperil themselves or others.360 Thus, if the Re-
porter had not reported the crime and been charged with violating such a Bad 
Samaritan law, then the Reporter could have raised her fear of Lonin as a de-
fense and that defense may have been successful if it were reasonable.361 Sec-
ond, the Reporter could have raised D.B.’s age as a defense.362 One defense the 
Reporter could not have asserted is her own age at the time because she was 
eighteen years old.363  
But could the Reporter, had she not reported, even have been charged 
with violating any Bad Samaritan law? The answer would depend on a court 
assessing relevant choice of law rules. New York (where the Reporter lived 
and viewed the February 27 livestream) does not have a Bad Samaritan law.364 
Even if New York did, the law would only be relevant in the Gates-Lonina 
case if it applied extraterritorially to out-of-state crimes of which the person in 
New York was aware.365 Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law does not explicitly 
apply extraterritorially and no court has interpreted it as doing so.366 Moreover, 
there was (and is) no relevant federal Bad Samaritan law in the United 
States,367 as there are in some foreign countries.368 
                                                                                                                           
 359 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. It is for this reason that the Reporter contacted 
D.B.’s mother through a fake Facebook account and still wants to remain anonymous. Author-
Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 360 See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 361 Multiple perspectives suggest that the Reporter’s fear of Lonin may have been reasonable: (1) 
Lonina told Close that her father frightened even her; (2) Close described Lonin as “abrasive” with 
police; and (3) Close characterized Lonin as “intimidating.” Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; 
CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124. 
 362 See supra notes 285–287 and accompanying text. All Receivers, for any relevant Bad Samari-
tan law restricting covered victims to those younger than seventeen, could have raised this defense. 
 363 CPD-Reporter Interview, supra note 159; see also Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1377 (arguing 
that Bad Samaritan laws should exempt children). Even Bad Samaritan laws in the United States that 
exclude children would not necessarily exempt eighteen-year-olds. In the United States, Bad Samari-
tan laws in at least Florida and Nevada explicitly exempt children from a duty to report but would still 
apply to eighteen-year-olds. See FLA. STAT. § 39.205(2) (2020) (applying the state’s duty to report 
child abuse or neglect law only to “a person who is 18 years of age or older”); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 202.888 (2020) (exempting “a person who [i]s less than 16 years of age” from the state’s duty to 
report law). 
 364 New York is not among the twenty-nine U.S. states that have Bad Samaritan laws applying to 
all persons. See Appendix, supra note 17 (compiling Bad Samaritan laws in U.S. states). 
 365 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing the extraterritorial application of states’ 
laws). 
 366 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 367 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1326 (“U.S. federal law . . . do[es] not feature a general Bad Samar-
itan law . . . .”). 
 368 Some countries have adopted a general duty on all citizens to report crimes. See Appendix, 
supra note 17. In France, for example: 
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Despite qualifying as an Upstander Receiver for her four reports, the Re-
porter still could have done more, and sooner. The Reporter did not directly or 
immediately contact law enforcement authorities; her conversations with the 
NYPD and CPD occurred only after her high school counselor informed the 
police several days following the crime. The Reporter did not disclose to the 
police the identity of her friend who was one of the Reproducer(s). Nor did the 
Reporter relay her concerns about the broadcast to the platforms that hosted 
the original or copied livestream of the rape: Periscope, YouTube, and VK.369 
The Reporter explains her decision not to alert any of these platforms by rhe-
torically asking: “I didn’t think that . . . was going to change anything . . . . 
What can they do?”370 But the platforms could have done something. Among 
other measures, the platforms could have asked Lonina and the Reproducer(s) 
to stop posting and remove their videos, halted the films themselves, disabled 
public access to the recordings and preserved them as criminal evidence (be-
fore Periscope’s automatic deletion at the time), suspended or banned Lonina 
and the Reproducer(s), or alerted authorities.371 At least one recent decision, 
the 2020 Ohio Court of Appeals case Godwin v. Facebook, Inc., rejected the 
claim that a platform was liable under the state’s general Bad Samaritan law 
for failing to report a felony.372 So, even if the Reporter had notified the rele-
vant platforms, they would not necessarily have complied or been charged with 
any crime for that omission. 
Furthermore, if the Reporter had only notified two of the individuals she 
did, she still may have faced liability. The Reporter explained that she contact-
                                                                                                                           
Any person who, having knowledge of a felony the consequences of which it is still 
possible to prevent or limit, or the perpetrators of which are liable to commit new felo-
nies that could be prevented, omits to inform the administrative or judicial authorities, 
is punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000. 
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 434-1 (Fr.). For discussion of Sweden’s Bad Samaritan 
laws, see supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 369 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 25–29 (discussing the mechanics of content moderation); Klonick, 
supra note 9, at 1635–48 (describing types of “content moderation” that is ex ante or ex post, reactive 
or proactive, automatic or manual); Langvardt, supra note 9, at 1355–56, 1361–62 (discussing meth-
ods of “private censorship,” such as asking users to remove content, interrupting videos, blocking 
content from posting, and suspending or closing users’ accounts); Author-Close Interview, supra note 
126 (stating that, in such a situation, the platform should notify law enforcement); Author-O’Brien 
Interview, supra note 76 (same); Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76 (same). 
 372 Godwin v. Facebook, Inc., 160 N.E.3d 372, 375–77, 382–83 (Ohio Ct. App.). For commentary 
on the case, see Eugene Volokh, Should Facebook Have a Duty to Report Us to the Police for Felo-
nies Potentially Revealed in Our Posts?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 9, 2020), https://
reason.com/2020/10/09/should-facebook-have-a-duty-to-report-us-to-the-police-for-felonies-potentially-
revealed-in-our-posts/ [https://perma.cc/T3S4-66R3]. 
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ed her high school counselor in part because D.B.’s mother had not responded 
to the private, anonymous messages that the Reporter sent her via Facebook.373 
In a hypothetical situation where (1) the Reporter had only notified D.B.’s 
mother and/or the Reporter’s high school counselor and (2) a relevant Bad Sa-
maritan law applied that required reporting to specific individuals (such as law 
enforcement authorities374), prosecutors might still charge the Reporter with 
violating the law because neither D.B.’s mother nor a high school counselor is 
a law enforcement authority.  
Even in this scenario, though, the Reporter could cite Bad Samaritan law 
jurisprudence in Ohio itself in her defense.375 In In re Stichtenoth, an Ohio 
Court of Appeals in 1980 reversed a juvenile’s conviction for violating Ohio’s 
general Bad Samaritan law.376 The minor, who had witnessed a stabbing, told 
two adults to call police, denied knowledge of the stabbing when directly ques-
tioned by police, and claimed to have made anonymous phone calls himself to 
police later that evening.377 The appellate court reasoned that the law’s re-
quirement to “report” to law enforcement authorities “includes both notifying 
law enforcement officials and setting in motion events which will result in no-
tification to these officials” and “does not proscribe a refusal to answer police 
questions once the police are aware of the crime.”378 The court then found that 
“[r]eporting a felony to responsible people at a large public place constitutes 
setting in motion events which will result in notification of law enforcement 
officials.”379 Applying the reasoning of In re Stichtenoth to the above-
mentioned Gates-Lonina counterfactual,380 the Reporter could have argued that 
telling only D.B.’s mother or the Reporter’s high school counselor—both of 
whom were or should have been responsible adults—set in motion the eventual 
notification of law enforcement officials.381 
d. Alexey Lonin 
Alexey Lonin, Lonina’s father, was another Receiver whose actions and 
omissions are relevant to the Gates-Lonina case.382 According to the Reporter, 
                                                                                                                           
 373 See supra notes 339–341 and accompanying text. 
 374 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
375 See In re Stichtenoth, 425 N.E.2d 957, 958–59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). 
 376 Id. at 958. 
 377 Id. 
 378 Id. 
 379 Id. 
 380 See supra notes 374–375 and accompanying text. 
 381 See CPD-Victim’s Mother Interview, supra note 358; supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
This argument would be supported by the fact that both D.B.’s mother and the counselor alerted au-
thorities. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 382 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
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during the February 27 rape, a teenager (“the Caller”) who was friends with 
Lonina called Lonin during the livestream “to tell him what’s going on.”383 
Specifically, the Reporter states, the Caller told Lonin that his daughter was 
broadcasting a real-time rape.384 Lonin allegedly then called Lonina, during 
which, according to the Reporter, he repeatedly asked Lonina “are you out of 
your mind?” and told her to “stop doing whatever you’re doing.”385 According 
to Lonina herself, her father then implored her to leave the scene because he 
assessed that what was happening was “serious.”386 The paucity of available 
evidence makes definite conclusions about Lonin’s potential culpability im-
possible. If, however, Lonina told Lonin about the rape during their conversa-
tion, Lonin could hear D.B. through the phone screaming or pleading, or Lonin 
personally watched the livestream, then, because of Lonin’s conversation with 
his daughter during the crime, he could qualify as both an Active Receiver and 
a Contemporaneous Receiver. Alternatively, if the Caller’s description was the 
only information Lonin had that the situation may be criminal, then he would 
likely not qualify as any type of Receiver and may have even doubted the 
Caller’s veracity. 
Additionally, Lonin’s position during the rape indicates that he may have 
been a Familiar Receiver. If Lonin actually knew or reasonably suspected that 
his daughter was filming the assault against D.B., he could have called the po-
lice. Instead or in addition, Lonin could have instructed Lonina to call the po-
lice or otherwise try to help D.B. Like the Reporter, Lonin was unusually well-
situated to help, even remotely, because of the significant contextual 
knowledge he possessed.387 Thus, like the Reporter, Lonin may qualify as a 
Familiar Receiver. Lonin probably did not have as much contextual knowledge 
as the Reporter, however, because no evidence suggests that he watched or was 
even aware of the livestream the previous night (in which Lonina undressed an 
intoxicated D.B.) or knew of Lonina’s history of mistreating her friends.388 
Nevertheless, Lonin was even better situated than the Reporter to help. Where-
                                                                                                                           
 383 Id.; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 384 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 385 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
According to the Reporter, this conversation was recorded in a version of the video that was posted to 
the Russian website, VK, and which was longer than the version the police possessed. Author-
Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129; Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 386 CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124; CPD-Victim’s Mother Interview, supra 
note 358. 
 387 Specifically, Lonin knew his daughter’s identity; was familiar with D.B. and her mother, hav-
ing recently dated the latter (which is how the teenagers initially met); and was aware that the rape 
was occurring in real time, in Columbus. Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch 
Interview, supra note 76; CPD-Lonina Interview – Transcript, supra note 124; CPD-Victim’s Mother 
Interview, supra note 358. 
 388 Reporter E-mail to Pietanza, supra note 141. 
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as the Reporter was located in another state and her friendship with Lonina had 
deteriorated, Lonin knew that he was physically in the same city in which the 
crime was occurring and may have wielded influence over Lonina as her par-
ent.389 Lonin himself acknowledges that he could—or perhaps even should—
have done more to instill upstanderism in his daughter, admitting later: “It 
seems like I also made a mistake here” with regards to Lonina’s upbringing.390 
But was Lonin’s “mistake” criminal? Possibly, if he meant he committed 
an error during Gates’s assault of D.B. Indeed, Lonin may have been the only 
individual who could have been charged with violating Ohio’s general Bad 
Samaritan law, as he may have been the only Receiver in that state.391 Unfor-
tunately, investigators and prosecutors were unaware of the conversation be-
tween Lonin and Lonina because it occurred outside the approximately ten 
minute recording they possessed392 and they were unable to obtain a longer 
version.393 Regardless, it is too late now to consider charging Lonin with vio-
lating Ohio’s general Bad Samaritan law, as the statute of limitations for such 
an offense—two years394—has expired. 
e. The Caller 
The Caller may have been a Familiar, Contemporaneous, Upstander Re-
ceiver. According to the Reporter, the Caller, while watching the February 27 
livestream, believed the video depicted a rape.395 The Caller also possessed 
contextual knowledge because she knew Lonina, the location of the crime, and 
Lonina’s parents’ contact information (including Lonin’s phone number).396 
Thus, like the Reporter; some other, unknown Receivers; and possibly Lonin, 
the Caller was a Familiar Receiver. Furthermore, like the Reporter and some of 
the Responders, the Caller was an Upstander Receiver because she contacted 
                                                                                                                           
 389 Don’t Stop Filming, supra note 125 (quoting Lonin). 
 390 Id. 
 391 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (West 2020). 
 392 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126. 
 393 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. If the 
prosecution had charged Lonin, they may have been able to present significant evidence that he vio-
lated OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A). The Reporter stated that she told at least the NYPD and 
possibly also the CPD about the phone calls between the Caller and Lonin and then Lonin and Lonina. 
Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. Moreover, testimony from the Reporter and the Caller, 
phone records between the Caller and Lonin, phone records between Lonin and Lonina, the recording 
posted to VK, and interrogations of Lonina and Lonin about the calls might have been useful evi-
dence. Convicting Lonin may not have even required obtaining any information from Periscope. 
 394 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.13(A)(1)(b) (“[A] prosecution [for violating Ohio’s general Bad 
Samaritan law] shall be barred unless it is commenced within . . . two years”); see id. § 2921.22(A). 
 395 Author-Reporter Interview 2, supra note 46. 
 396 Id. Lonina’s friends, of which the Caller had been one, had each other’s parents’ contact in-
formation. Id. 
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Lonin, ostensibly to encourage him to intervene.397 In addition, like at least one 
of the Reproducer(s), the Responders, the Reporter, and possibly Lonin, the 
Caller was also a Contemporaneous Receiver because she acted while the 
broadcast was ongoing.398 Unlike the Reporter, however, the Caller did not 
contact police. Thus, the Caller, despite her upstanderism in alerting Lonina’s 
parent (who may have been able to influence his daughter’s actions), was most 
similar to the Active Receivers who merely provided negative feedback be-
cause she did not comply with any Bad Samaritan law that would have re-
quired her to notify law enforcement. 
Figure 3 displays the Receiver typology’s corresponding actors from the 
Gates-Lonina case. 
FIGURE 3. Digital Age Samaritans in the Gates-Lonina Case: Receivers 
 
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR BAD SAMARITAN LAWS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
This Part offers prescriptions for Bad Samaritan laws in the digital age.399 
Legislators should modernize, refine, proliferate, and publicize these statutes 
and law enforcement should enforce the laws or leverage them to obtain wit-
ness testimony. Aggregating these recommendations, this Part concludes by 
proposing a contemporary model Bad Samaritan law. 
                                                                                                                           
 397 Id. 
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 399 See infra notes 400–479 and accompanying text. 
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A. Modernize and Refine Bad Samaritan Laws 
When new Bad Samaritan laws are introduced or existing statutes are 
amended, they should be updated to reflect the modern era’s reality and tech-
nology. These changes should include addressing physical presence, evidence 
preservation and reporting recipients, the scope of these laws, penalties for 
violation, and exemptions from compliance.400 
1. Physical Presence 
Physical presence, an element of some Bad Samaritan laws, should be 
addressed in two ways. First, any physical presence requirement should be re-
moved from these statutes. Second, where the law is limited to individuals at 
the scene401 or an element of the law requires observation,402 legislators should 
amend those features either to mandate mere knowledge or to clarify that ob-
servation or presence can be physical or virtual.403 Given technological ad-
vancements that enable Receivers—particularly Familiar Receivers—to learn 
reliably of crimes contemporaneously or near-contemporaneously, physical 
presence should not be an element of the crime of failing to intervene.404 Argu-
ably, France,405 Germany,406 Russia,407 and some U.S. states408 already extend 
such affirmative duties to those not physically present at the scene. Some U.S. 
courts adjudicating recent remote involvement in an emergency situation have 
validated the theory of virtual presence.409 Omitting physical presence as a re-
quirement of Bad Samaritan laws would not make all Receivers potentially 
                                                                                                                           
 400 See infra notes 400–451 and accompanying text. 
401 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6(a) (2021) (applying only to a person “at the scene of a 
crime”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2021) (applying only to a person who “is at the scene of 
said crime”). 
 402 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 403 Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Analysis, 11 ROGER WIL-
LIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 101–03 (2005) (reviewing French and German approaches to having a physical 
presence or knowledge requirement); see supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
 404 For discussion of the relationship between physical proximity and Bad Samaritan laws, see 
Jeremy Waldron, Who Is My Neighbor?: Humanity and Proximity, 86 MONIST 333 (2003). Waldron’s 
analysis, however, omits contemplation of virtual proximity. See id. 
 405 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 223-6 (Fr.). 
 406 STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 323c, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
stgb/__323c.html [https://perma.cc/UP8V-JA4G] (Ger.). 
 407 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 125 (Russ.). 
 408 See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
 409 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 2016) (holding that evi-
dence was sufficient for finding probable cause that virtually present defendant caused victim’s 
death). For a critique of the virtual presence theory in this case involving suicide encouragement, see 
generally Charles Adside III, The Innocent Villain: Involuntary Manslaughter by Text, 52 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 731 (2019). 
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culpable, however, especially if the statutes did not apply extraterritorially410 
or included, as I propose in this Article, reasonable exemptions from report-
ing.411 
2. Evidence Preservation and Reporting Recipients  
Bad Samaritan laws should explicitly address situations where Transmit-
ters and Receivers genuinely intend to preserve evidence of a crime or alert 
authorities. Although in the Gates-Lonina case Lonina unconvincingly claimed 
those objectives,412 it is possible other Transmitters and Receivers could make 
these assertions credibly.413 After all, if the Reproducer(s) had not recorded 
Lonina’s livestream, prosecutors may not have been able to hold Gates ac-
countable.414 Consider the following situations: (1) a Transmitter sends images 
of a crime to their own parent and asks that person to call the police; and (2) a 
Receiver tells their teacher about evidence of a crime they saw on social media 
and requests that the latter contact law enforcement. In both situations, these 
witnesses would not have directly discharged a duty to report to law enforce-
ment authorities but could have done so indirectly. The holding in the 1980 
Ohio Court of Appeals case In re Stichtenoth415—that setting in motion events 
which will result in notification to law enforcement may satisfy Bad Samaritan 
laws—could be incorporated into these statutes to explicitly excuse from lia-
bility Transmitters and Receivers who intend to induce reporting to police, 
even if they do not directly alert authorities.416 
Alternatively, legislators could draft or amend Bad Samaritan laws in ei-
ther of two ways to address Transmitters’ and Receivers’ temptations to alert 
individuals other than police. On the one hand, these statutes could, like one in 
Texas, explicitly exclude indirect reporting by stating that the witness “may not 
delegate to or rely on another person to make the report.”417 Prohibiting an ac-
tor from reporting indirectly may increase accountability. On the other hand, 
these laws, such as one in Washington, could reasonably expand the list of in-
dividuals beyond law enforcement authorities to whom reports must be made 
                                                                                                                           
 410 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 411 See infra Part IV.A.5. 
 412 See supra notes 197–199 and accompanying text. 
 413 See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 72 (describing case in which a sexual assault victim’s mother 
found a video of the crime on Facebook, recorded the video on her computer screen, and sent the 
recording to the police). 
 414 See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
 415 In re Stichtenoth, 425 N.E.2d 957 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); see supra notes 376–379 and accom-
panying text. 
 416 See Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 417 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(b) (West 2019). 
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to explicitly include certain other authority figures.418 This latter option could 
list, for example, public school officials; as government employees, these per-
sonnel are presumably responsible authorities who have even greater duties 
than their private school counterparts. Victims’ relatives, however, should not 
be included in an expanded list, as the 1985 Ohio Court of Appeals case State 
v. Wardlow demonstrates that family members may have conflicts of interests 
(such as affection for or allegiance to perpetrators) that discourage them from 
reporting crimes.419 Whichever of these options legislators pursue for refining 
Bad Samaritan laws, they should also clarify in these statutes that neither mere 
copying of visual or audio data from social media nor mere republishing of this 
content to the same or a different platform—as the Reproducer(s) in the Gates-
Lonina case did—is sufficient to discharge a legal duty to report.420 
3. Scope of Bad Samaritan Laws  
Legislators should also refine Bad Samaritan laws’ ambit and reach. 
These statutes should be limited in scope to narrow police and prosecutorial 
discretion and encourage witnesses to focus on reporting serious offenses.421 
Bad Samaritan laws should thus apply only to specified violent crimes: the 
actual or attempted commission of murder, kidnapping, sexual assault, aggra-
vated assault, and felonious assault. This approach follows the currently enact-
ed Bad Samaritan laws in Alaska422 and Massachusetts,423 and reflects how 
some other types of U.S. statutes are similarly limited to enumerated offens-
es.424 Where Bad Samaritan laws are not already so narrow, legislators should 
amend them. 
While limiting Bad Samaritan laws’ subject matter, legislators should 
broaden their geographic reach. As Receivers may observe evidence of a crime 
in another jurisdiction, Bad Samaritan laws should explicitly apply extraterri-
torially where some elements of the offense are committed within the jurisdic-
                                                                                                                           
 418 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1) (2021) (requiring reporting of violent crimes to “the prose-
cuting attorney, law enforcement, medical assistance, or other public officials”). 
 419 State v. Wardlow, 484 N.E.2d 276, 277–79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (reversing conviction for 
violation of Bad Samaritan law because it infringed defendant’s right to self-incrimination). 
 420 Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. 
 421 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 422 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.765, 11.56.767 (2020) (applying to murder, attempted murder, kid-
napping, attempted kidnapping, sexual penetration, and attempted sexual penetration). 
 423 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2021) (applying to “aggravated rape, rape, murder, man-
slaughter, [and] armed robbery”). 
 424 For example, U.S. federal and state wiretapping statutes are restricted to specified crimes. See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (restricting interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications only to 
enumerated offenses); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-406 (West 2021) (authorizing wire-
tapping for murder, kidnapping, rape, and other enumerated crimes). 
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tion’s borders and others are perpetrated elsewhere.425 Many criminal laws in 
the United States already apply beyond their state boundaries.426 
Lastly, Bad Samaritan laws should not include a victim age restriction. 
Some duty-to-report laws mandate intervention only when victims are children 
or young teenagers.427 That D.B. was seventeen years old when Gates raped 
her in the Gates-Lonina case428 serves as a tragic reminder that adolescents and 
adults are crime victims, too, and could benefit from Bad Samaritan laws 
prodding assistance to them. While neither of Ohio’s Bad Samaritan laws con-
tains a victim age restriction,429 the limitation in California has had a negative 
consequence. In 2009, a sixteen-year-old girl was gang raped in Richmond, 
California, for at least two hours in the presence of ten to twenty people.430 
Because California’s duty-to-report law applies only to victims who are under 
the age of fourteen,431 prosecutors could not charge bystanders to the crime 
with a violation or offer them immunity from that charge in exchange for tes-
timony.432 
4. Penalties for Violation 
Bad Samaritan laws should not include imprisonment among potential 
sanctions. Alternative penalties (e.g., a fine, citation, probation, community 
service) could express moral revulsion towards unexcused bystanders without 
exacerbating the problem of mass incarceration.433 
                                                                                                                           
 425 DOYLE, supra note 96, at 21–22 (stating that this scenario is “[p]erhaps the most common state 
statutory provision claiming state extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction”); George, supra note 95, at 622 
(observing that state courts have penalized conduct that primarily occurred beyond the state’s bounda-
ries “whenever any act pertaining to the criminal transaction occurs or takes effect within the forum 
state, even though in fact the major activity took place elsewhere”). 
 426 DOYLE, supra note 96, at 21–23; George, supra note 95, at 621–28 (“[I]t is clear that, by 
means of one theoretical device or another, American state courts have penalized conduct which for 
all important purposes took place beyond the states’ boundaries.”). 
 427 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(a) (West 2021) (applying to victims “under 14 years of 
age”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.882.1 (2020) (applying to victims “12 years of age or younger”). 
 428 CPD-Victim Interview, supra note 129. 
 429 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (West 2020); id. § 2151.421. 
 430 Robert J. Lopez, California; Crime Reporting Law Is Proposed; After a Richmond Teen’s 
Rape, an Assembly Bill Would Require Witnesses to Call in Violent Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2009, at A26; Sarah Netter & Emily Friedman, Four Charged in California Homecoming Gang Rape, 
ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/WN/police-arrest-richmond-california-gang-
rape/story?id=8935918 [https://perma.cc/585P-L26N]. 
 431 See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 432 Should the Current Duty to Report the Commission of a Murder, Rape, or Specified Sex Of-
fense of a Person Under the Age of 14 Be Extended to a Victim of Any Age?: Hearing on A.B. 984 
Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2–3, 7 (Cal. 2010); Kaufman, No Cover for 
Abusers, supra note 13. 
 433 For discussion of penalties for violating Bad Samaritan laws, see Kaufman, supra note 3, at 
1391–93 (stating that some states impose fines and others jail time). For discussion of the expressive 
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As it relates to the Gates-Lonina case, critics of carceral feminism would 
presumably support the view that unexcused bystanders to gender-based vio-
lence, such as Gates’s rape of D.B., should not be jailed.434 According to Pro-
fessor Aya Gruber, this strand of feminism has “played such a distinct role in 
broadening and legitimizing the unconscionable penal state” that “many femi-
nists regret that feminist law-and-order policies contributed to a carceral re-
gime that disserves marginalized people, including women.”435 Thus, by im-
posing non-carceral penalties, Bad Samaritan laws could encourage assistance 
to crime victims without increasing the already enormous number of Ameri-
cans under some form of correctional control. 
 While imprisonment should be excluded from available punishment for 
violating a Bad Samaritan law, these statutes should consider aggravating fac-
tors that warrant more severe punishment than mere passivity. Specifically, 
Bad Samaritan laws should address situations, such as in the Gates-Lonina 
case, in which a spectator not only violates the statute but also records the cri-
sis and uploads that footage to social media. A failed bill in the Florida legisla-
ture sought to do just that. In 2017, five teenagers in the state recorded them-
selves mocking a man, Jamel Dunn, as he drowned and then posted the video 
to YouTube.436 Outraged by the spectators’ callous response to this tragedy,437 
a state senator introduced a Bad Samaritan law that would impose a more se-
vere penalty for “a person who, in the course of committing a violation of [the 
required assistance], videotapes or otherwise electronically records the endan-
gered person and uploads the recording to a social media or social networking 
website.”438 While the bill died in committee,439 this initiative should be used 
                                                                                                                           
function of law, see generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 434 The phrase “carceral feminism,” coined in 2007 by Professor Elizabeth Bernstein, is a theory 
that “describe[s] late twentieth-century feminism’s commitment to law and order . . . [using] ‘the 
carceral state as the enforcement apparatus for feminist goals.’” Aya Gruber, #MeToo and Mass Incar-
ceration, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 275, 280 (2020) (quoting Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of 
the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 128, 143 (2007)). 
 435 Gruber, supra note 434, at 275, 280, 283; see also AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON 
CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 1, 20 (2020). 
 436 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1387–88. 
 437 Lorelei Laird, Proposed Florida Law Resurrects the Debate Around the Legal Duty to Help 
Someone in Distress, ABA J. (June 1, 2018), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/florida_
bad_samaritan_law [https://perma.cc/2RGR-7RCQ]. 
 438 S.B. 516 (Fla. 2018), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/516/BillText/Filed/HTML 
[https://perma.cc/MHP4-3CQY] (noting that, while a violation of the Bad Samaritan law is a misde-
meanor of the first degree, a person who makes and uploads a recording commits a felony of the third 
degree). 
 439 SB 516: Duty to Provide Emergency Assistance, Bill History, FLA. SENATE, https://www.fl
senate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/516 [https://perma.cc/9EQZ-T8ZT] (noting that the bill died in the 
Criminal Justice Committee on March 10, 2018). 
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as a model for imposing greater misdemeanor sanctions on violators of Bad 
Samaritan laws who also make and share footage of the situation online. 
5. Exemptions from Reporting 
Reasonable exemptions, nine of which are included in the model statute 
below, should be common across all Bad Samaritan laws.440 First, many exist-
ing duty-to-report laws exempt individuals who reasonably fear that reporting 
would place themselves or someone else in danger of serious bodily injury or 
death.441 If this exemption is not already part of the statute, as in Ohio’s gen-
eral Bad Samaritan law,442 then legislators should amend such laws to include 
it. 
Second, Bad Samaritan laws should not require civilians to report police 
brutality, at least not to police themselves. Otherwise, Transmitters and Re-
ceivers would be obliged to notify the very entity whose misconduct they ob-
serve. These witnesses would understandably be reticent to report for fear of 
retribution and doubt that reporting would be effective. Even if civilians were 
required to report police brutality instead to a prosecuting authority, such as a 
district attorney or state attorney general’s office, these witnesses may still feel 
reluctant given the close relationship between prosecutors and police.443 Re-
gardless, civilians already can document police abuses if they want, as U.S. 
courts have recognized a First Amendment right to film government officials, 
including police officers and subject to reasonable limitations, engaged in their 
duties in a public place.444 Conversely, police themselves should not be exempt 
from this duty to report their fellow officers’ misuse of force, given that they 
are well-situated and equipped to do so. Indeed, some police duties to report or 
even intervene in these contexts already exist445 or have been introduced in the 
wake of Derek Chauvin killing George Floyd in May 2020.446 
                                                                                                                           
 440 See infra notes 477–479 and accompanying text (proposing a Failure to Report Specified Vio-
lent Crimes Model Statute). 
 441 See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 442 See supra notes 275–276 and accompanying text. 
 443 See generally Maybell Romero, Prosecutors and Police: An Unholy Union, 54 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1097, 1103 (2020) (documenting, expressing concern about, and proposing measures to mitigate 
“overly cozy relationships between police and prosecutors”). 
 444 See, e.g., Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 
82 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that there is a “constitutionally protected right to videotape the police car-
rying out their duties in public”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 445 For example, the Bakersfield Police Department in California imposes on every member of the 
department a duty to intervene in and to report a colleague’s unreasonable use of force. BAKERSFIELD 
POLICE DEP’T, BAKERSFIELD PD POLICY MANUAL § 300.2.1 (2020), http://docs.bakersfieldcity.us/
weblink/0/edoc/1455482/300%20USE_OF_FORCE.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2QD-TY59]. The manual 
states that: 
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Third, as previously discussed, Bad Samaritan laws should exempt indi-
viduals who would incriminate themselves in the same or even an unrelated 
offense if they reported the crime.447 Fourth and fifth, as I have argued else-
where, Bad Samaritan laws should not apply to individuals who reasonably do 
not perceive the offense or are children because they may not comprehend 
what they witness.448 
Sixth, contrary to some existing Bad Samaritan laws,449 individuals who 
know or reasonably assume that the offense has already been reported to law 
enforcement authorities or other public officials should be excused from liabil-
ity under a duty-to-report law. It would not necessarily be helpful—and, given 
the limited time and resources of police and prosecutors, could even be harm-
ful—for authorities to receive and process multiple reports about the same 
crime. Bases for reasonable assumption in this context could include hearing 
another witness state that they are going to call 911 or seeing another witness 
speak to police during or immediately after the offense. Mere knowledge that 
other people witnessed the crime should not be considered a basis for reasona-
bly assuming that the offense has been reported. Otherwise, anyone who 
                                                                                                                           
Any officer present and observing another officer using force that is clearly beyond that 
which is objectively reasonable under the circumstances shall, when in a position to do 
so, intercede to prevent the use of unreasonable force. An officer who observes another 
employee use force that exceeds the degree of force permitted by law should promptly 
report these observations to a supervisor. 
Id. 
 446 See Matt Furber et al., supra note 86 (describing the George Floyd killing). For exam-
ple, in July 2020, four members of the Connecticut General Assembly introduced a bill mandat-
ing a police duty to intervene in and to report another officer’s unreasonable, excessive, or 
illegal use of force. H.B. 6004, July Spec. Sess. § 30(a)(1)–(2) (Conn. 2020). The bill provides 
that: 
Any police officer . . . who while acting in such officer’s law enforcement capacity, 
witnesses another police officer use what the witnessing officer objectively knows to be 
unreasonable, excessive or illegal use of force, shall intervene and attempt to stop such 
other police officer from using such force . . . . [and] shall report, as soon as is practica-
ble, such use of force to the law enforcement unit . . . that employs the police officer 
who used such force. 
Id. 
 447 See supra notes 259–268 and accompanying text. 
 448 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1377 (“Individuals who do not perceive the true nature of a situa-
tion as a crime or crisis qualify as ‘unaware bystanders.’ Such misperception may be caused by, for 
example, mental illness, poor vision or hearing, intoxication, drowsiness, sleep, or unconsciousness.”). 
Similarly, “children may not understand the nature of a crime or crisis or have sufficient capacity to 
exercise sound judgment to act in such circumstances. Children also may not know what they could 
do to help or may be under parental (or other guardian) control.” Id. 
 449 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2223(e) (2021) (“It is not a defense that another mandatory 
reporter made a report.”). 
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knows that they are among a crowd of people witnessing a crime could be ex-
empted from reporting it. 
Seventh, as I have argued elsewhere, Bad Samaritan laws should not ap-
ply to victims of the particular offense.450 Eighth and ninth, as I have also ar-
gued elsewhere, if the offense is a sexual assault, then Bad Samaritan laws 
should exempt any survivor of that type of crime or individuals who have been 
asked not to report it by a competent adult victim of that specific attack.451 
B. Proliferate and Publicize Bad Samaritan Laws  
Throughout the United States 
The current patchwork of Bad Samaritan laws inhibits the legal system 
from addressing the realities of the digital age, in which Receivers increasingly 
witness evidence of crimes sent by Transmitters. Thus, legislators should pro-
liferate and publicize these statutes sub-nationally and nationally to increase 
their applicability.452 
Within the United States, legislators should expand the number of Bad 
Samaritan laws in the states and territories to address crimes that are commit-
ted and remotely observed in the same jurisdiction. Although twenty-nine 
states and Puerto Rico already have these statutes applying to most or all phys-
ically present witnesses,453 every state and territory should feature these laws. 
Legislators could introduce or amend, or courts could interpret, these laws to 
apply extraterritorially.454 
Likewise, legislators should expand Bad Samaritan laws at the federal 
level to address two situations. First, these statutes should include crimes with-
in the United States that are committed in one U.S. state or territory and are 
remotely observed in another, as occurred in the Gates-Lonina case.455 Because 
the crime observation occurs online, these situations implicate interstate com-
merce, which provides a jurisdictional hook for federal law enforcement.456 
Second, these statutes should include specific federal offenses in their subject 
                                                                                                                           
 450 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1377, 1385 (arguing that victims sometimes favor keeping the 
crime private or may be too traumatized to disclose to law enforcement). 
 451 Id. at 1377, 1385–86. 
 452 See Swan, supra note 13, at 1029–33, 1046 (arguing that Bad Samaritan laws “should be ex-
panded to more jurisdictions”). 
 453 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 454 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 455 In the Gates-Lonina case, the rape occurred in Ohio and was observed in at least one other 
state (New York). Author-Reporter Interview 1, supra note 129. Other scholars have similarly pro-
posed creating federal laws in the digital context to address a patchwork of laws at the state and terri-
tory levels. See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 9, at 1363–70 (proposing a federal law limiting content 
moderation practices). 
 456 Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
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matter. Congress should thus supplement its narrow, enacted Bad Samaritan 
laws (such as the Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport 
Authorization Act457) and similarly restricted, proposed Bad Samaritan laws 
(such as the State Harassment and Assault Prevention and Eradication 
(SHAPE) Act458) with a broader law that applies to more crimes and spectators 
of them. This national legislation should feature a duty-to-report law that con-
cerns (1) virtually witnessing from one U.S. state or territory certain local vio-
lent crimes (specifically, the actual or attempted commission of murder, kid-
napping, sexual assault, aggravated assault, and felonious assault) that are 
committed in a different U.S. state or territory and (2) physically or virtually 
witnessing particular federal crimes (including sexual assault aboard aircrafts 
and in federal prison459 as well as human trafficking460 and terrorism461). 
While proliferating Bad Samaritan laws, legislators should also publicize 
them, for two reasons. First, if the existence of these statutes is unknown, then 
they are ineffective at prodding upstanderism.462 Second, raising awareness of 
Bad Samaritan statutes would help counter lawbreakers’ assertion that their 
convictions would violate due process because they had insufficient legal no-
tice of their affirmative duties under the statutes.463 
                                                                                                                           
 457 See supra note 23 (requiring the reporting of suspected child abuse, including sexual abuse, to 
certain adults who are authorized to interact with minor or amateur athletes at a facility under the 
jurisdiction of a national governing body). 
 458 H.R. 8465, 116th Cong. § 8 (2020) (requiring bystander intervention training for U.S. De-
partment of State employees on sexual misconduct). Congresspersons Joaquin Castro, Eliot Engel, 
and Jackie Speier introduced the SHAPE Act on September 30, 2020. Id.; Jennifer Hansler, Demo-
crats Introduce Legislation to Strengthen Anti-sexual Harassment Protocols at State Department, 
CNN (Sept. 30, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/30/politics/shape-act-state-department/index.
html [https://perma.cc/Q8RK-MZQ6]. I contributed language to the statute that was incorporated into 
this section of the legislation. 
 459 18 U.S.C. § 7 (defining U.S. special maritime and territorial jurisdiction); id. §§ 2241−2244 
(criminalizing rape and sexual abuse under special maritime and territorial jurisdiction). 
 460 Id. §§ 2421–2429 (defining federal sex trafficking offenses). 
 461 Id. §§ 2331–2339D (criminalizing use of weapons of mass destruction, national terrorism, and 
other similar offenses). 
 462 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1404 (proposing that efforts to publicize Bad Samaritan laws 
“could be similar to, modeled after, and possibly even tied to the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity’s ‘If You See Something, Say Something’ campaign”). 
 463 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 226–27 (1957) (holding that provisions of a 
felon registration ordinance violated due process when applied to a person who had no actual 
knowledge of her duty to register and where no showing was made of the probability of such 
knowledge). This case is particularly relevant to a Bad Samaritan case because both involve omis-
sions. Id. at 228 (“Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might be 
suffered for mere failure to act.”); Ken M. Levy, Normative Ignorance: A Critical Connection Be-
tween the Insanity and Mistake of Law Defenses, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 432 (2020) (noting that 
there are at least four exceptions to the general maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse, includ-
ing that the defendant did not receive fair notice of the law). 
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C. Enforce or Leverage Bad Samaritan Laws 
Bad Samaritan laws could help promote justice and accountability if they 
are actually applied. Punishing—or at least threatening to penalize—failures to 
report crime may incentivize more witnesses to intervene helpfully. The Gates-
Lonina case exemplifies the lack of enforcement of Bad Samaritan laws. The 
fact that police did not investigate and prosecutors did not indict anyone in the 
Gates-Lonina case for violating a Bad Samaritan law is just the latest example 
of how infractions of these statutes are seldom charged or successfully prose-
cuted, at least in the United States. A counterargument against increased en-
forcement is the potential for police and prosecutorial abuse, perhaps especial-
ly in minority communities.464 However, given the discrepancy between how 
widespread these statutes already are465 and how rarely they are enforced,466 
concern over discriminatory application may be overblown at present.467 
Bad Samaritan law advocates—including, in the Gates-Lonina case, 
Close, O’Brien, Rausch, and Shamansky—often favor having these statutes on 
the books even if their purpose is just to symbolically convey ideal conduct 
amid crises.468 Despite having compelling reasons not to charge Lonina with a 
violation, no one from the CPD considered investigating, let alone charging, 
any of the hundreds of Receivers for violating a Bad Samaritan law, including 
Lonin and the Reproducer the Reporter told police she knew. Given their lim-
ited resources and time, police and prosecutors prioritized addressing the un-
derlying crime of rape.469 Fortunately, one of the Receivers (the Reporter), 
without even being prodded by a positive or negative incentive, acted as an 
upstander. But other viewers did not know or could not assume that someone 
was going to report the crime or preserve evidence of it. Worse, some of those 
other viewers (the Enabler Receivers) proactively contributed to the crime, 
whether by offering Lonina positive feedback or recording the livestream and 
republishing it on another platform. 
Three lessons about enforcing Bad Samaritan laws can be drawn from the 
Gates-Lonina case. First, as with other statutes,470 law enforcement often de-
                                                                                                                           
 464 Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey, supra note 3, at 1341. 
 465 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the state of Bad Samaritan laws in twen-
ty-nine U.S. states and Puerto Rico). 
 466 David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 653, 685 (2006); Benzmiller, supra note 7, at 951, 957 (Bad Samaritan laws “have been 
only selectively enforced, with rare prosecutions and even rarer convictions”). 
 467 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1341. 
 468 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76; Author-
Rausch Interview, supra note 76; Author-Shamansky Interview 1, supra note 76. 
 469 Author-Close Interview, supra note 126; Author-Rausch Interview, supra note 76. 
 470 Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1719, 1722–40 (2006) 
(analyzing underenforcement of laws concerning “urban residents, prostitutes, undocumented work-
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cides not to enforce duly enacted Bad Samaritan laws. In the Gates-Lonina 
case, the CPD’s and prosecutors’ choice not to charge violations of Ohio’s Bad 
Samaritan laws substitutes their wisdom and wishes for that of the state’s legis-
lators. As Professor Alexandra Natapoff argues, such underenforcement weak-
ens the rule of law and undermines democratic legitimacy.471 Especially given 
the performative nature of some sexual and other crimes in which Transmit-
ters’ and Receivers’ intervention could be helpful, underenforcement or out-
right nonenforcement of Bad Samaritan laws could exacerbate the related 
problem of underenforcing rape laws, leaving vulnerable groups as doubly vic-
timized.472 Future research should promote understanding of why police and 
prosecutors underenforce Bad Samaritan laws and whether, and how, they may 
be prompted otherwise. 
Second, a hierarchy among Transmitters and Receivers, as illustrated in 
Figure 4, should guide enforcement of Bad Samaritan laws. Police and prose-
cutors should prioritize holding Transmitters accountable over Receivers. Pre-
cisely because they are physically present, Transmitters are better able than 
Receivers to gauge the authenticity of the situation and to report the location, 
date, time, and description of a crime. Nevertheless, Transmitters may be better 
able than Receivers to assert the defense that they reasonably feared for their 
physical safety if they were to intervene in any way, even just by recording 
what was occurring. 
Police and prosecutors should also prioritize charging Enabler Transmit-
ters and Receivers over their bystander and upstander counterparts. Enablers 
should be most liable of these three subtypes because their affirmative con-
duct473 demonstrates their knowledge of and involvement in a crime. Upstand-
ers should be least liable of these three subtypes because, by seeking to inter-
vene helpfully, they at least tried to render aid, even if the nature of that assis-
tance did not fulfill the particular requirements of any relevant Bad Samaritan 
laws.  
Furthermore, police and prosecutors should prioritize bringing to justice 
certain other Receiver subtypes. Active Receivers who provide positive feed-
back to Transmitters should be more liable than Passive Receivers because, 
                                                                                                                           
ers, and victims of domestic violence”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Pro-
tection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1291–92 (2016) (analyzing underenforcement of rape laws). 
 471 Natapoff, supra note 470, at 1718, 1721. 
 472 Id. at 1717 (“In practice, underenforcement is often linked with official discrimination, in-
creased violence, legal failure, and the undemocratic treatment of the poor. Underenforcement can 
also be a form of deprivation, tracking familiar categories of race, gender, class, and political power-
lessness.”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 470, at 1327–28 (discussing the underenforcement of rape laws 
and how it may embolden criminals to commit sexual assaults). 
 473 For discussion of spectators’ affirmative conduct justifying criminal liability, see Allen, supra 
note 5, at 851–54. 
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like with enablers, the former’s affirmative conduct demonstrates their aware-
ness of and engagement in a crime. Contemporaneous Receivers should be 
more liable than Delayed Receivers because the latter may have more reason 
to believe that the crime has already been reported. Furthermore, Delayed Re-
ceivers that are so delayed in observing evidence of a crime that the offense is 
no longer in progress should face no liability because they are not present, 
even virtually. Familiar Receivers should be more liable than Unfamiliar Re-
ceivers because the contextual knowledge the former possess increases the 
likelihood that they can assess the scene’s authenticity and provide crucial in-
formation to investigators. Of course, digital manipulation could still fool Re-
ceivers who intimately know individuals who are ostensibly involved in a 
crime, leaving these witnesses with no greater insight than complete strangers. 
FIGURE 4. Liability Hierarchy Among Transmitters and Receivers 
 
Applying this hierarchy to the Gates-Lonina case, despite the police’s and 
prosecutors’ compelling reasons not to charge Lonina with violating Ohio’s 
general Bad Samaritan law, they should have at least investigated Lonin and 
the Reproducer whom the Reporter told police she knew.474 
In other cases, this hierarchy could be complicated by potential overlap 
and fluidity between and among Transmitters, Receivers, and their various 
subtypes. For example, in certain scenarios, a Receiver could become a 
Transmitter and vice versa. In these cases, prosecutors should use their discre-
tion to interpret the principles identified in this hierarchy to hold the most cul-
pable parties to account. 
Third, Bad Samaritan laws should actually be enforced or used as lever-
age against certain Transmitters and Receivers that qualify as “Unexcused By-
standers,” individuals who do not have reasonable excuses for remaining pas-
                                                                                                                           
 474 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2020); id. § 2921.22(A). 
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sive and thus are not justified in refraining from acting as upstanders.475 Rather 
than charging violations of the laws, prosecutors could offer witnesses immun-
ity in exchange for their testimony or other cooperation. O’Brien notes that 
investigators in Ohio use the state’s general Bad Samaritan law in this way.476 
D. Model Bad Samaritan Law for the Digital Age 
Given the recommendations in this Article and my other scholarship on 
Bad Samaritan laws,477 the following is a model Bad Samaritan law for the 
digital age proposed for U.S. states and territories.478 
Failure to Report Specified Violent Crimes 
(A) Reporting Requirement: 
(1) Except as provided in division (B), any person who knows 
or reasonably should know about the actual or attempted 
commission of murder, kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravat-
ed assault, or felonious assault of another person and is pre-
sent at the scene shall not knowingly fail to report that in-
formation to law enforcement authorities. 
(2) The report shall be made immediately but not later than 24 
hours after the person knows or reasonably suspects that the 
crime was committed or attempted. If the person has no rea-
sonable method for such reporting immediately or at least 
within 24 hours, then the person shall make the report as 
soon as reasonably practicable. 
(3) The actual or attempted crime of which the person knows 
or reasonably should know may occur anywhere in the Unit-
ed States. 
(4) The report shall include the reporter’s name and contact in-
formation; details about how the reporter became aware of 
the attempted or completed crime; and, to the extent known 
by the reporter, the names, descriptions, and contact infor-
mation of the perpetrator(s) and victim(s) as well as the date, 
time, location, and description of the attempted or completed 
                                                                                                                           
 475 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1378 (identifying three subtypes of Unexcused Bystanders: “Ab-
stainers,” “Engagers,” and “Enablers”). 
 476 Author-O’Brien Interview, supra note 76. 
 477 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 478 For a model Bad Samaritan law exclusively focused on cyberbullying, see Benzmiller, supra 
note 7, at 952–53. For a model Bad Samaritan law addressing Transmitters but not necessarily Re-
ceivers, see Yamen et al., supra note 6, at 142–44. For a model duty-to-rescue statute, see Jay Silver, 
The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 434–36 (1985). 
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crime. The report may include any other pertinent infor-
mation. 
(5) Presence at the scene may be either physical or virtual. Vir-
tual presence may be established when a person receives ev-
idence of the crime electronically. For example, through vir-
tual means (for instance, text messages, email, social media, 
phone applications, livestreams, or recordings), the person 
may hear words or sounds, read written words, or see photo-
graphs or videos. 
(6) The person may not delegate the duty to report to or rely on 
another person to make the report unless doing so is a rea-
sonable means of expediting the report and the person knows 
that the other person makes the report. 
(7) Copying of visual or audio data from social media and re-
publishing this content to the same or a different platform 
does not discharge this duty to report. 
(B) Exemptions: 
(1): The following people are exempted from the reporting re-
quirement in division (A): 
 (a) Individuals who reasonably fear that, by reporting, 
they would place themselves or someone else in danger of 
suffering serious bodily injury or death. 
 (b) Individuals whose report would concern police brutali-
ty if those individuals are not themselves employed by a 
law enforcement agency. 
 (c) Individuals who would incriminate themselves in the 
same or an unrelated offense if they reported the offense. 
 (d) Individuals who reasonably do not perceive the of-
fense. This misperception may be caused by, for example, 
mental illness, poor vision or hearing, intoxication, drows-
iness, sleep, or unconsciousness. 
 (e) Children, as defined by this jurisdiction’s law. 
 (f) Individuals who know or reasonably assume that the 
offense has already been reported to law enforcement au-
thorities or other public officials. Mere knowledge that 
other people witnessed the offense is not a basis for rea-
sonably assuming that the offense has been reported. 
 (g) Individuals who were victims of the offense. 
 (h) If the offense is sexual assault: 
  (i) Individuals who are survivors of a sexual assault. 
  (ii) Individuals who have been asked not to report by 
any competent adult victim of this specific sexual assault. 
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(2) The reporting requirement in division (A) shall not be con-
strued to affect privileged relationships as provided by law. 
(C) Penalties: 
(1) Any person (except those listed in division (B)) who know-
ingly fails to make a report required by this law shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine (of not more 
than $500), citation, probation, or community service. 
(2) Any person (except those listed in division (B)) who (a) 
knowingly fails to make a report required by this law and (b) 
purposely records the scene and uploads that footage to a so-
cial media or networking website shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor punishable by a fine (of not more than $1000), cita-
tion, probation, or community service. 
(3) Imprisonment shall not be a punishment for (C)(1) or (2). 
(D) Effect on Liability for Enumerated Crimes:479 Nothing con-
tained in this Act shall alter existing law with respect to liability 
for murder, kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravated assault, or fe-
lonious assault. 
CONCLUSION 
The Gates-Lonina case illustrates choices that everyone may face in the 
digital age to be an enabler, bystander, or upstander. Of the more than 700 
people who watched the rape, most did nothing to help. Lonina herself exacer-
bated the crime by livestreaming it, and hundreds of Receivers prodded her to 
continue doing so. Disappointingly, only one Receiver (the Reporter, who was 
not even in the same state) almost immediately reported the crime, ultimately 
notifying the police. Without the Reporter—who provided police with still im-
ages and a link to where a recording of the livestreamed rape could be found—
investigators and prosecutors may not have obtained footage of the crime and 
their case against Gates would thus have been far weaker. Other Receivers 
(specifically, the Responders who provided Lonina with negative feedback and 
the Caller) also displayed upstanderism but neglected to notify law enforce-
ment. 
Although the Gates-Lonina case may have been unprecedented, it is em-
blematic of a broader phenomenon. Many more situations involving spectators 
to crimes have already occurred and will continue to arise.480 It is thus im-
portant to draw lessons from these episodes for bystanderism and upstanderism 
in the modern era. 
                                                                                                                           
 479 For discussion of such a provision, see Silver, supra note 478, at 436, 443–44. 
 480 See supra notes 52–54, 67–76 and accompanying text. 
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First, Bad Samaritan laws should be modernized, refined, proliferated, 
publicized, and either enforced or leveraged to obtain witness testimony. Leg-
islators should use this Article’s proposed model Bad Samaritan law for the 
digital age to introduce new statutes or amend existing ones. Such laws, where 
they already exist but are not applied, raise the question of whether they at 
least hold symbolic weight.481 If the laws do not carry this significance or if the 
laws’ practical costs outweigh their symbolic benefits,482 legislators should 
consider rescinding those laws or assuming that they have lapsed through des-
uetude.483 
Second, there is a wide variety of bystanders, upstanders, and enablers, 
and modern technology complicates and expands that assortment. Consequent-
ly—and recognizing that police and prosecutors have limited time and re-
sources—this Article recommends distinguishing witnesses’ legal culpability 
so that law enforcement can prioritize their accountability. The original typol-
ogy and hierarchy of Transmitters and Receivers described in this Article pro-
vides a guide for this process. 
Finally, the cliché is true: one person can make a difference. This obser-
vation is all the more accurate in the digital age, when witnesses—such as the 
Reporter in the Gates-Lonina case—often have easy, speedy, low-risk access to 
technology to document, raise awareness about, and report crimes. Social me-
dia and mobile devices have generated new opportunities for users to prevent 
or stop offenses and preserve evidence for investigations and prosecutions. The 
law should incentivize such socially beneficial conduct. Recent examples of 
such upstanderism are a reminder that the worst of humanity can also bring out 
the best. 
                                                                                                                           
 481 For discussion of the symbolic significance of Bad Samaritan laws, see H.M. Malm, Liberal-
ism, Bad Samaritan Law, and Legal Paternalism, 106 ETHICS 4, 15 n.21 (1995) (noting the potential 
value of “publicly enunciating the social judgment that persons have obligations to prevent harm to 
strangers,” which might help “define our common community and affect for the better our behavior in 
the long run” (quoting a reviewer of the journal)) [hereinafter Malm, Liberalism]; see also Heidi 
Malm, Good and Bad Samaritanism, in 4 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 2192, 
2198 (Hugh LaFollette ed. 2013) (“[T]he strongest case for bad samaritan laws lies in their educative 
function. According to this view, even if bad samaritan laws are rarely enforced, having them ‘on the 
books’ sends an important educative message to us all. It tells us part of what we stand for as a com-
munity, what we expect of each other, and what we won’t, in principle, tolerate. Callously omitting to 
aid another is a serious act. Proponents of bad samaritan laws want to send that message through the 
criminal law.”). 
 482 See Malm, Liberalism, supra note 473, at 15–16. 
 483 “Desuetude” is the common law doctrine that “laws that are hardly ever enforced . . . [have] 
lapsed, simply because they lack public support.” Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of 
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 49–50 (defining desuetude 
and discussing its application at common law). 
